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I. ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY
Based on experiences of federal workplace ombuds' since the late
seventies until today, there is a growing body of information pertaining to
the different ways in which federal workplace ombuds offices function. By
focusing on ombuds offices in five different agencies, 2 this Article
identifies the areas in which they have had the greatest impact.
The workplace ombuds is generally a highly placed agency employee
who is "a neutral member of the [organization] who provides confidential
and informal assistance to employees in resolving work-related concerns
and is outside the normal management control structure." 3  More
specifically, the ombuds serves both management and employees as a
"confidential and informal information resource, communications channel,
complaint-handler and dispute-resolver, and a person who helps an
* The author is currently the Senior Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
Specialist, Office of the General Counsel at the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). This project started when she was a visiting fellow at the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) shortly before it closed due to
lack of funding. Portions of this work were made possible by a generous grant to ACUS
by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. The author would like to thank members
of the staff at ACUS for their support, especially Charles Pou, as well as numerous
others including, but certainly not limited to, the Board and members of The
Ombudsman Association, the Office of the Ombudsman at the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and all the federal workplace Ombuds with whom she spoke. The
SEC disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement of any SEC
employee or Commissioner. This Article expresses the author's views and does not
necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the Commissioners or other members of
the staff.
1 Today, because some object to titles which include "man," alternatives to the
word "ombudsman" have arisen, including "ombuds," "ombudsperson" and even
"ombuddy." ViRGIL M. MART, OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK iii (1994) [hereinafter
OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK]. Unless specifically counter-indicated, the term "Ombuds" is
used in this Article.
2These include the U.S. Secret Service, the U. S. Information Agency
International Broadcasting Bureau, the Smithsonian Institution, the U. S. Department of
Energy and the U.S. Department of State.
3 Lee P. Robbins & William Deane, The Corporate Ombuds: A New Approach to
Conflict Management, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 195, 197 (1986).
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organization work for change" 4 by recognizing trends, surfacing potential
problems or issues and recommending changes. The ombuds has no power
to direct that actions be taken or undone but rather may recommend actions
or policy change.
This Article contains several case studies of federal agency ombuds
offices and, based on that and other information, presents a series of
recommendations. The following are circumstances in which a federal
workplace ombuds office may be most effective:
1. If an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) agency office is
beleaguered with complainants who are not presenting EEO
matters.
2. If an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) office is
receiving workplace complaints that are outside the EAP office's
mandate.
3. If the personnel-related offices are not working together as a
team.
4. If employee morale is low.
5. If communications between employees and management are
suffering.
6. If management is caught by surprise by the emergence of
significant workplace issues.
7. If management and unions are constantly at loggerheads.
8. If an agency has been faced with numerous claims of
retaliation.
This Article also underscores certain design elements essential to the
effective functioning of the ombuds office, such as soliciting stakeholders'
views prior to initiating the program, and ensuring that the ombuds is a
high-ranking employee, supported by and reporting to top management and
able to maintain confidentiality of all dispute resolution communications.
This Article also discusses the particular difficulties encountered by federal
4 Mary P. Rowe, Options, Functions and Skills: What an Organizational
Ombudsman Might Want to Know, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 103, 103 (1995).
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agencies in attempting to maintain and ensure confidentiality in ombuds
offices.
II. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
commissioned a study5 and issued recommendations 6 encouraging the
establishment of federal ombudsmen who "investigate external grievances
against the government and recommend ways of dealing with the
grievances they consider meritorious. " 7 Since neither the study nor the
recommendations addressed the role of federal workplace ombuds, ACUS,
prior to its closing, requested the author to report on this growing federal
function. The purpose was to learn whether federal workplace ombuds have
been effective. If so, the study would seek to identify the ways in which
they have had the greatest impact.
The experiences of federal workplace ombuds, beginning in the late
seventies with the Smithsonian Ombuds Office, provide a growing body of
information pertaining to how these offices function. There are differences
among the federal offices and, to some extent, with the ombuds in the
private sector. The broad guidelines of the ombudsman's description and
the novelty of the position provide the ombuds with great latitude and
flexibility to structure the office as most appropriate for the ombuds and the
organization. 8
The workplace ombuds is an agency employee who is "a neutral
member of the [organization] who provides confidential and informal
assistance to employees in resolving work-related concerns and is outside
the normal management control structure." 9 More specifically, the ombuds
serves both management and employees as a "confidential and informal
information resource, communications channel, complaint-handler and
5 See generally DAVID R. ANDERSON & DIANE M. STOCKTON, OMBUDSMEN IN
FEDERAL AGENCIES: THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE (1990).
6 See The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies, Admin. Conf. of the United States,
Recommendation 90-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-2 (1993).
7 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMINISRATvE CONFERENCE OF THE UNrIED
STATES, THE OMBUDSMAN: A PRIMER FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES 2 (1991) (emphasis
added).
8 See Deborah M. Kolb, Corporate Ombudsman and Organization Conflict
Resolution, 31 CONFUICT REsOL. 673, 675 (1987).
9 Robbins & Deane, supra note 3, at 197.
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dispute-resolver, and a person who helps an organization work for
change. "10
A workplace ombuds is a highly placed individual, often reporting to
the agency or division head, but not part of line management. This helps to
preserve the independence, neutrality and credibility of the ombuds. The
ombuds has no power to direct that actions be taken or undone but rather,
working with internal staff, recommends actions or policy change. The
decision-making power at all times rests with management. Another key
facet of the function is that the person seeking the ombuds's assistance,
who in this Article is called the "inquirer," is encouraged to consider all
options available to him or her. Since the ombuds's role generally is to help
people help themselves, she will typically explore with the inquirer the
option of discussing the matter directly with her supervisor without the
ombuds's direct involvement. If the inquirer deems this approach
inappropriate or ineffective, the ombuds may become directly involved in
resolution efforts.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE WORKPLACE OMBUDS11
"The ombudsman has come to America's startled attention as a kind of
Scandinavian fairy tale. "12
The ombuds function has existed for almost two hundred years. The
workplace ombuds, however, is a relatively new phenomenon. In the last
10 Rowe, supra note 4, at 103.
11 The word "ombudsman" can be traced back to the Frostathing Law of 1274 in
Norway, in which an ombudsman was an agent, one who had power to act for another.
See Lester B. Orfield, The Scandinavian Ombudsman, 19 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 7 n.2
(1966) (citing LAURENCE M. LARsON, THE EARLIEST NORWEGIAN LAWS BEING THE
GULATHING AND THE FROSTATHING LAW TRANSLATED FROM THE OLD NORWEGIAN 409
(Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies Series No. 20) (1935)). According to
Stanley V. Anderson, one of the two punishments that could be inflicted on lawbreakers
of early Germanic tribes was a fine to be paid by the family of the culprit to the family
of the aggrieved person. The neutral person who was appointed to collect the fine and
deliver it to the victim was called an Om ("about") bud (the messenger collecting the
"fine"). See generally STANLEY V. ANDERSON, OMBmDSMAN PAPERS: AMERICAN
ExpEmRNCE AND PROPOsALs (1969).
12 Isidore Silver, The Corporate Ombudsman, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1967,
at 77, 77 (emphasis added).
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twenty years it has begun spreading throughout the country in both the
public and private sector. The precise reasons for its evolution have never
been thoroughly identified. According to Dr. Mary Rowe, Ombudsperson
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), there was simply a
need causing several corporations independently to "invent the wheel." 13
The original purpose of the ombuds was to protect the citizenry from
the abuse of governmental power. In establishing its ombuds in 1809
pursuant to constitutional mandate, Sweden became the first country to
establish a national ombuds, 14 the "Justitieombudsmn."'15 In 1919, Finland
became the second country to establish an ombuds.16 It was over thirty-five
years later before other countries adopted the concept: Denmark in 1955
and Norway and New Zealand in 1962.17 Although the duties and
jurisdiction of each office varied somewhat, they were all appointed by the
legislature and empowered to review executive branch decisions. They also
had discretion to issue public reports of their findings.' 8
American interest in the ombuds idea did not really begin to blossom
until after the mid-1950s when Stephan Hurwitz, the first Danish
ombudsman, spread the word about the practice of ombuds internationally
through articles, lectures and visits.19 American scholars, lawyers and
politicians then began exploring its application to the United States.20
13 Telephone Interview with Dr. Mary P. Rowe, Ombudsperson at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and expert in the practice of ombuds (July 6,
1996).
14 See David R. Anderson & Diane M. Stockton, Federal Ombudsmen: An
Underused Resource, 5 ADMI. L.J. 275, 279 (1991) (citing Henry S. Reuss & Stanley
V. Anderson, The Ombudsman: Tribune of the People, 363 ANNULS AM. AcAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 44, 45 (1966)).
15 WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZEN'S PROTECTORS IN NINE
CouNTRs 194 (1966).
16 See Anderson & Stockton, supra note 14, at 280.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See generally ANDERSON, supra note 11; GELLHORN, supra note 15; WALTER
GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
(1966); DONALD C. ROWAT Er AL., OMBUDSMAN FOR AMERICAN GOvERNMENT 9
(Stanley V. Anderson ed. 1968); DONALD C. ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN: CrZEN's
DEFENDER (Donald C. Rowat ed., 2d ed. 1968); Henry A. Abraham, A People's
Watchdog Against Abuse of Power, 20 PuBuC ADMI. REv. 152, 152-157 (1960);
Anderson & Stockton, supra note 14.
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Until the late sixties, the ombuds primarily dealt with the public,
investigating and responding to complaints on agencies' behavior. The
ombuds may have been affiliated with a government agency or may have
been created by statute. The common attributes of the Scandinavian
Ombuds model were:
1. All [were] instruments of the legislature but function[ed] independently
of it, with no links to the executive branch and with only the most general
answerability to the legislature itself.
2. All [had] practically unlimited access to official papers bearing upon
matters under investigation, so that they [could] themselves review what
prompted administrative judgment.
3. All could express (publicly, if necessary) an ex officio expert's opinion
about almost anything that governors did and that the governed did not
like.
4. All [took] great pains to explain their conclusions, so that both
administrators and complaining citizens [would] understand the results
reached.21
From the seventies to the present, the concept of the ombuds began to
evolve more flexibly. Prisons, universities and corporations began
establishing ombuds offices. 22 By the late eighties in the United States, five
states had classic ombuds offices; each state had a long-term care ombuds;
and many cities had ombuds offices, as did dozens of school systems,
prisons and mental-health .organizations. 23 In addition, "client" ombuds
proliferated, including thousands of patient representatives in hospitals,
over thirty-five newspaper ombuds serving readers, public utility and
public service ombuds and ombuds for public agencies. Professional
21 WALTER GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL
GmEvANcE PROCEDURES 9-10 (1966).
22 See Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and
Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REv. 845, 1032-1033
(1984).
23 See Telephone Interview with Dr. Mary Rowe, supra note 13.
[Vol. 13:2 1998]
FEDERAL WORKPLACE OMBUDS
associations had ombuds officials serving their membership. 24 "There
[were] at least [one] hundred college and university ombuds offices and at
least two hundred ombuds offices [in] corporations in North America."25
Isidore Silver, then an Assistant Professor of Business Law at the
University of Massachusetts, was one of the first to suggest application of
the principles of ombudsmanry to the workplace. His notion evolved from
readings on the Swedish model of applying collaborative efforts to limit
corporate conflict. He was concerned about social and corporate
responsibility and how the individual could be heard in a big
bureaucracy. 26 In 1967, Silver wrote:
If the corporation is to provide fair and equal treatment to employees, it
should ideally combine the virtue of fair-mindedness with the necessities
of thrift and efficiency. Such an impartial grievance outlet exists in the
political world and, I would argue, could readily be adapted to the
corporate realm. It is the institution of the ombudsman. 27
In 1969, Stanley V. Anderson proposed that "[a] powerful case can be
made for ombudsman-like institutions in all businesses and professions
dealing with people"28 as long as the ombuds is not a substitute for
adequate internal grievance machinery, a public advocate or an information
and referral service. In a 1972 article, J.H. Foegen further developed and
promoted the concept of a workplace ombuds. 29 Like Silver, Foegen was
impelled by concerns that as corporations continued growing in size two
problems would result: "a diminished voice for individuals and.., greater
pressure on the formal system, resulting in slower service." 30 As a method
for "cutting [through the] red tape," he suggested that "the highest level
company and union officials," with input from rank and file, "should
appoint a knowledgeable, respected person from the community to serve
24 See Mary P. Rowe, Ombuds Jobs are Proliferating, and Characterized by
Diversity, 2 ALTEmNATnvE Disp. REsOL. REP. (BNA) 198, 198-199 (May 25, 1988).
25 Id. at 199.
26 See Telephone Interview with Professor Isidore Silver (Feb. 16, 1996).
27 Silver, supra note 12, at 77.
28 ANDERsoN, supra note 11, at 58.
29 See J. H. Foegen, An Ombudsman as Complement to the Grievance Procedure,
23 LAB. L.J. 289, 294 (1972).
30 1d. at 289.
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[as ombuds] for an agreed-upon term." 31 Assuming this person had
"availability, neutrality and power," the ombuds would provide the
employee with an "expressway to the top." 32 He theorized that "pressure
on the formal system would be reduced" and matters would be resolved
more expeditiously. 33 He warned, however, that major resistance would be
"likely if the proposed [ombuds] is [viewed] as a substitute for the regular
grievance procedure. "34
After these initial articles, little if anything was written in the area of
workplace ombuds for several years. By 1982, however, there was
sufficient interest in workplace ombuds practice that seven people met in
the President's Conference Room at MIT and informally began The
Corporate Ombudsman Association. 35
Beginning in the late seventies, federal executive agencies began
establishing workplace ombuds programs as well. 36 In 1977, the
Smithsonian Institution established a workplace ombuds. 37 In 1985, the
United States Information Agency (USIA) briefly established an ombuds
program. In 1988, the ombuds was reestablished for the Voice of America,
the international broadcasting division of USIA. 38 In 1987, the United
31 Id. at 293.
3 2 Id. Foegen's use of the term "power" in this context is potentially misleading.
His concern is that the Ombuds have "enough power to be heard effectively anywhere
in the organization" and that top-management's support for the Ombuds is "overt and
publicized." Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 6-1. The Corporate Ombudsman
Association was formally established in 1985. In 1992, as the diversity of its
membership grew, the association changed its name to The Ombudsman Association.
See id.
36 A notable exception was an early pilot organizational ombudsman program
established from April through October 1971 in the Federal Aviation Administration
Western Region. See FED. AvIATiON ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE USE OF AN
ORGANIZATION OMBUDSMAN IN THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WESTERN
REGION 1971 (W. Bruce Chambers & James L. Lampl eds., 1971). While the program
evaluation was very positive, there are no records indicating whether the program
continued beyond the six month pilot program.
37 See Interview with Chandra Heilman, Smithsonian Institution Ombuds (Oct. 18,
1995).
38 See Interview with Robert Henry, United States Information Agency (USIA)
International Broadcasting Bureau Ombuds (Nov. 28, 1995).
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States Secret Service established a pilot ombudsman program.39 Towards
the end of the same year, Congress directed the United States Department
of State to establish an "Ombudsman for Civil Service Employees."4 Into
the nineties, other federal agencies have continued to experiment with the
ombuds concept.41
By 1988, ombuds jobs were proliferating with estimates that at least
two hundred ombuds offices existed within corporations in North
America. 42 This growth has been attributed to "increasing heterogeneity in
the workforce, rapidly changing laws and statutes, an increasingly well-
educated employee pool, and stresses associated with huge increases in
government contracting." 43
Arguably, however, one of the most significant influences on the
growth of the corporate ombuds function came in 1991 from the United
States Sentencing Commission, which created guidelines for sentences
imposed on corporations as a result of illegal activity of their employees.44
Under these guidelines, penalties are influenced by the ethical climate
within the organization. The guidelines state that if certain programs have
been established, the penalties may be lowered even if the corporation has
been found in violation of civil or criminal laws.45
39 See Brian Gimlett, U.S. Secret Service Uses Ombudsman to Help Reduce
Personnel Problems, 2 WoRLD ARB. & MEDIATION Rm'. 19, 19 (1991).
40 See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 § 172, 22
U.S.C. § 2664(a) (1994).
41 In 1991, ACUS issued a report and recommendations encouraging agencies to
consider establishing an ombudsman. See The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies,
Admin. Conf. of the United States, Recommendation 90-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-2
(1993); Anderson & Stockton, supra note 5. Although that study and the concomitant
recommendations focused almost exclusively on ombuds who dealt with concerns
originating external to the agency, the recommendations have been used as support in
developing and legitimizing federal workplace ombuds.
42 See Rowe, supra note 24, at 199.
43 Mary P. Rowe, The Corporate Ombudsman: An Overview and Analysis, 3
NEGOTIATION J. 127, 127-139 (1987).
44 See U.S. SENMNCING GUIDEUNES MANUAL ch. 8 (1995).
45 An "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law" is a
program that has been reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that it
generally will be effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.... The
hallmark of an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law is that the
organization exercised due diligence in seeking to prevent and detect criminal
conduct by its employees and other agents.
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By December 1997, The Corporate Ombudsman Association had
evolved from the small group of seven, meeting in the MIT conference
room, into an active association with 299 members and associate members
and an annual conference. 46 The number of offices of federal workplace
ombuds has grown to thirteen,47 and the number of corporate ombuds has
grown to over one thousand. 48
After twenty years of development, the definition and function of a
workplace ombuds has evolved. According to Rowe, a workplace ombuds
is:
a confidential and informal information resource, communications
channel, complaint-handler and dispute-resolver, and a person who helps
an organization work for change .... Their purpose is to foster values
and decent behavior--fairness, equity, justice, equality of opportunity, and
respect .... The organizational ombudsperson is a designated neutral
within an organization and usually reports at or near the top of that
organization, outside ordinary management channels. 49
Both the designation of neutrality and direct access to the chief
executive officer help to preserve the independence and contribute to the
effectiveness of ombudspeople. 50
The current understanding and practice of ombuds, then, is very broad
and flexible with an array of applications in different situations.
Id. § 8A1.2 commentary 3(k). One of the required steps is "to achieve compliance with
its standards, e.g.,.. . by having in place and publicizing a reporting system whereby
employees and other agents could report criminal conduct by others within the
organization without fear of retribution." Id. § 8A1.2 commentary 3(k)(5).
46 See Telephone Interview with Carole Trocchio, Executive Director of The
Ombudsman Association (Mar. 1998).
47 Federal workplace ombuds exist at the U.S. Secret Service, Smithsonian
Institution, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of State, Central Intelligence
Agency, Office of Research Services-National Institutes of Health, Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, U.S. Social Security
Administration, United States Information Agency International Broadcasting Bureau,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Capitol Police and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
48 See Telephone Interview with Dr. Mary P. Rowe, supra note 13.
49 Rowe, supra note 4, at 103. Rowe refers to an "organizational" ombuds
practitioner. The term "organizational ombudsperson" is more inclusive, referring to an
ombuds who serves internal staff, clients of the organization or both. See id. at 104.
50 See id. at 103
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IV. AGENCY CASE STUDiES
This section describes the array of applications through five federal
workplace ombuds: the Smithsonian Institution, United States Information
Agency-United States Broadcasting Services, United States Secret Service,
United States Department of State and United States Department of Energy.
Each of these offices is currently operating and provides essential
information regarding the functioning of workplace ombuds within the
federal structure. These five offices were selected out of thirteen federal
ombuds offices to provide a balance in terms of longevity, genesis and
logistics.
Each of the following discussions is based on detailed oral interviews
with the ombuds and, if applicable, an assistant, a member of the EEO
office and representatives from other offices that provided arguably
overlapping services, such as the EAP, legal department, union or
grievance office.51 The interviews were conducted in 1995 and 1996 and
the Article is therefore based on information available at that time.
Individuals from related offices were included in the Article based on the
view that an ombuds office is but a part of an agency's overall dispute
resolution mechanism, including other formal and informal procedures. 52
After examining what has worked and what has not worked in each of these
offices, lessons and recommendations regarding possible expansion and
functioning of future federal workplace ombuds offices can be extracted.
A. United States Secret Service
1. Agency Description and Impetus to Create the Ombuds Office
The United States Secret Service is a bureau within the Treasury
Department with 4755 employees, 2065 of whom are special agents, 1152
are police officers and 1538 are professional, technical and administrative
personnel. There is no union presence at the Secret Service. The Secret
51 In accordance with the practice of the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution
I will refer to the ombuds as "she" throughout the Article. The decision whether to
interview a representative of a particular office was made jointly by the ombuds and the
author. As with Kolb's research into the ombuds practice, I was unable to interview
inquirers because of confidentiality concerns. See Kolb, supra note 8, at 677.
52 See Mary P. Rowe, The Ombudsman's Role in a Dispute Resolution System, 7
NEGOTIATION J. 353, 356-357 (1991).
559
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Service has a two-fold mission: to investigate crimes against the currency
and certain other securities and to protect the President and family, the
Vice President and family, former presidents and spouses, foreign heads of
state and major presidential candidates during campaign years. Employees
are located throughout the United States as well as at various locations
overseas. Headquarters are in Washington, D.C.
The Secret Service Ombudsman Program was developed in December
1986 when management determined that the Uniformed Division, which
comprised approximately twenty-five percent of the Secret Service
workforce, was "experiencing an abnormally high number of personnel
problems compared with.., other organizational units." 53 In addition,
according to the EEO manager, many of these complaints in the Uniformed
Division did not fall within either EEO or grievance procedures. After
bringing in consultants to evaluate the problems, the Secret Service learned
that employees' "major perceptions" of workplace problems were
"incomparability [of pay], injustices in the evaluation and promotion
system, .... lack of consistency, fairness 'and mutual respect within the
division, and inconsistencies in... policies and procedures' and their
inequitable application." 54 In addition, the consultants learned that the EEO
procedures were being used in a way inconsistent with their purpose:
The fact that the formal administrative grievance procedure was viewed
with a jaundiced eye had [resulted in a trend whereby] employees who
wished a fair investigation of an issue, or just to strike back at a
supervisor or the Division, [would resort] to fil[ing] an EEO complaint
even when the employee [honestly did not feel that the issue was a result
of] discrimination. 55
Based on the consultants' recommendations the Service initiated a pilot
ombudsman program in the Uniformed Division on October 15, 1987.56 Its
evaluation after the first year found that management and employees were
pleased with the performance of the office: employees reported that they
had "someone to turn to when they could not resolve an issue," tensions
were reduced and policies and procedures were modified and approved.57
53 Gimlett, supra note 39, at 19.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 Id. at 20. The report is unclear as to whether management was similarly polled.
560
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Although there was some concern initially that the ombuds office was
infringing on management's supervisory authority, in 1989 the Service
Director expanded the ombuds jurisdiction to include all Service employees
and supervisors.5 8 Since 1989, there have been three Special Assistants to
the Director (SATD) who have served as chief ombuds for the Service. The
current ombuds was assigned in April 1995.
2. Mission and Structure of the Ombuds Office
The mission of the ombuds program at the Secret Service is to assist in
seeking fair, equitable solutions to work-related concerns through an
informal confidential process. According to the ombuds brochure, the
ombudsman "also provides unfiltered feedback to management by reporting
issues and trends-without discussing names." 5 9 During an interview,
however, the current ombuds noted that while "upward feedback"
regarding Service policies and procedures is one of the responsibilities of
the ombuds, he, thus far, had not encountered situations requiring him to
engage in that aspect of his job.60 The Service's ombuds program is open to
all Service employees, at all levels, regarding all workplace issues
including interpersonal conflicts, workplace disputes, safety issues,
bureaucratic red tape and harassment. 61 "Success," according to the current
ombuds, is to be able to continue the ombuds program for employees as an
option:
[It is not essential] to solve every problem in the agency. Some things just
can't be solved. A successful program is not generated on
statistics.... Success is that it is out there, employees know about it as a
viable option, and they use it. The ultimate result should be a workforce
that feels it is being treated fairly with regard to work-related issues. 62
58 See Telephone Interview with Art Pettaway, Secret Service EEO Manager (Jan.
1996).
5 9 DEPARTMENT oF THE TREASURY UNrrED STATES SECRET SERvICE, OMBUDSMAN
PROGRAM BROCHURE 1(on file with author) [hereinafter SECRET SERvICE OMBUDSMAN
BROCHURE].
60 Interview with Dan Petrole, Secret Service Ombuds (Mar. 28, 1996).
61 See SEcRET SERvICE OMBUDSMAN BROCHURE, supra note 59, 3
62 See Interview with Dan Petrole, supra note 60.
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The ombuds program states very clearly in its literature that while the
program is available as an alternative method of addressing employee
concerns, it "is not intended to replace or circumvent the formal
Administrative Grievance Procedure, EEO system or the duties and
responsibilities of the Office of Inspection." 63 The ombuds program will
not discuss a matter with an employee if he or she is in a formal process.
An ombuds will also withdraw if an inquirer has retained counsel. In all
cases, however, the employee reserves the right to file a formal complaint
through the relevant administrative system as long as the requirements for
that system are met.64 According to the Service EEO manager, the Service
EEO office tries to be flexible in terms of time deadlines for contacting an
EEO counselor if the reason for delay is that an employee has sought the
assistance of the ombuds.6 5 However, if the matter is not resolved and the
employee chooses to file a formal complaint, it must be processed by the
Department of Treasury EEO office. It is likely that the Department will
reject the inquirer's formal complaint if time requirements have not been
met.66
A cornerstone of the ombuds approach is to encourage and empower
the employee to discuss the matter directly with those involved. 67 If that
does not resolve the matter, the employee is encouraged to discuss the
matter with his or her supervisor. If that fails or is impracticable for any
reason, the ombuds may intervene. With the inquirer's permission, the
ombuds will generally attempt to discuss the matter first with first-line
management. Only if this is unsuccessful and the inquirer grants permission
will the ombuds consider discussing the matter with management up the
chain of command. 68
The structure of the Service ombuds program is unusual in the federal
government in that there is one SATD, a GS-15,69 and a number of
63 U.S. SECRET SERVICE, U.S. SECRET SERVICE DmEcTrIvEs MANUAL § ADM-
3(2), at 1 (1989).
64 See id. at2.
65 See Telephone Interview with Art Pettaway, supra note 58.
66 See id.
67 See Methods of handling ethics complaints at MIT and the U.S. Secret Service,
EmIIos, Nov./Dec. 1990, at 7-9.
68 See id.
69 Federal agencies use a position classification system that divides workers
primarily into general schedule (GS) employees and senior executive service (SES).
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"collateral duty" ombuds serving throughout the United States.70 The
SATD is selected by and reports on paper to the director of the Service,
who has delegated program development and management to the deputy
director. The deputy director also conducts the SATD's annual evaluation.
The collateral duty ombuds are employees who have full-time jobs at the
Service, unrelated to their ombuds's function. Each ombuds performs her
work in addition to her full-time job at the Service. The collateral duty
ombuds reflect a diversity of racial and ethnic identities, geographic
locations, grade levels and divisions within the Service. Currently, the
ombuds office has twelve collateral duty ombuds who report in their
ombuds capacity directly to the SATD. The collateral duty ombuds receive
training and guidance from the SATD. In addition, all collateral duty
ombuds participate in training sponsored by a national ombuds association.
In the event that a collateral duty ombuds is unable to resolve the matter or
experiences a conflict of interest, she is encouraged to call the SATD either
to explore options or to refer the matter to him. With respect to their full-
time employment, they continue to be evaluated by their current rating
official, who receives input from the SATD regarding performance of the
ombuds-related functions.71
The SATD obtains information in several ways: by participating as a
member of the director's staff in senior staff meetings, by participating in
task forces, by listening to the inquirers and by walking the halls and
speaking to people. 72
The SATD estimated that he spent approximately 35% of his time
handling cases and calls that are specifically related to an inquirer and
consulting with the collateral duty ombuds on their cases.73 He spends little
time, on average, working on systemic change issues, in part because he
has not identified such issues as yet.74 Approximately 25% of his time is
spent on promoting or publicizing the ombuds program and slightly over
Depending on seniority, a GS-15 in Washington, D.C. in 1996 earned an annual salary
between $73,486 and $95,531.
70 The ombuds program at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
also follows this model. Both the Service and ATF are agencies within the Department
of the Treasury.
71 See Interview with Dan Petrole, supra note 60.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
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10% on training.75 Participating in task forces or meetings unrelated to any
of the above consumes about 5% of his time and general information
gathering consumes approximately 20% of his time. 76
3. Basic Elements: Confidentiality and Neutrality
According to the Service brochure, "confidentiality is the
rule.... Ombudsmen take no action without permission unless criminal
behavior is involved, or a life has been threatened." 77 To date, he has
never had to break a confidence. 78 Confidentiality of the ombuds process
appears to be supported throughout the agency. In fact, the current SATD
stated that his ability to maintain confidentiality is of key importance in the
agency. 79 This was confirmed by the EEO manager who believed that
confidentiality was the "saving grace" of the ombuds program and the EAP
coordinator who underscored the importance of the ombuds office's ability
to maintain confidentiality of communications with people under stress.80
Recently, however, one of the collateral duty ombuds was subject to
subpoena in an EEO matter about an onbuds-related matter. The SATD
argued against her appearance, underscoring the need for confidentiality
and the availability of the information elsewhere.81 The Department of
Justice attorney representing the agency had just agreed to revisit the issue
when the case was settled and the matter became moot. There have been no
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests or requests from the Inspector
General's Office for Ombuds documents or discussions with the legal
department in anticipation of such requests.
To support its requirement for confidentiality, the SATD has his own
office, apart from others of the director's staff, and does all his own
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 SECMR SERVICE OMBUDSMAN BROCHURE, supra note 59, 6. The Code of
Ethics of The Ombudsman Association states, in relevant part, "It ]he Ombudsman, as a
designated neutral, has the responsibility of maintaining strict confidentiality concerning
matters that are brought to his/her attention unless given permission to do otherwise.
The only exceptions, at the sole discretion of the Ombudsman, are where there appears
to be imminent threat of serious harm." OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 2-5.
78 See Interview with Dan Petrole, supra note 60.
79 See id.
80 See Telephone Interview with Art Pettaway, supra note 58.
81 See Interview with Dan Petrole, supra note 60.
[Vol. 13:2 1998]
FEDERAL WORKPLACE OMBUDS
support work except for general correspondence unrelated to specific
inquirers.82 The office is locked when the SATD is not present and, except
for a second key in a special officer's desk, no one else has access.8 3 All
case files are in a locked desk drawer to which only the SATD has the
key. s4 Within the office is an answering machine unrelated to other agency
systems. As soon as a case is completed, he destroys all his notes.8 5 The
only information he retains is statistical or generic, none of which could be
used to identify particular individuals.8 6
Neutrality/independence is another key element in establishing the
ombuds program. Because the ombuds has no line authority, his reporting
relationship and widely-known access to the director is significant. The
current SATD was not aware of any challenges by senior management to
his neutrality.8 7 The EAP coordinator underscored that he had been
impressed with the SATD's neutrality and cited this clear objectivity as one
of the ways in which the ombuds office had functioned particularly well.88
4. Is It Working?
Management has not sought formal program evaluation or justification
in part because of the institutionalization and successful reputation of the
program. On a periodic basis, the SATD develops reports on the ombuds
program to review the issues raised and to spot trends in workplace
issues.89 By identifying two or three cases that most likely would have gone
to litigation, the SATD establishes the cost effectiveness of the program.
One recent report prepared by the previous SATD noted the characteristics
of clients by gender, race, position and location. The results demonstrated
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 The Code of Ethics of The Ombudsman Association states, in relevant part,
"[t]he Ombudsman must take all reasonable steps to protect any records and files
pertaining to confidential discussions from inspection by all other persons, including
management." OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 2-5.86 See Interview with Dan Petrole, supra note 60.
87 See id.
88 See Interview with Ralph Biase, EAP Coordinator (Dec. 1995).
89 See Interview.with Dan Petrole, supra note 60.
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that the employees using the program were roughly proportional to the
Service-wide population.9°
The report also identified the issues raised and compared them to the
issues and concerns raised in 1990. The largest number of concerns came
from management-related issues, although they have decreased significantly
since 1990. The biggest increase came from concerns around pay and
compensation. In the first four months of his tenure as SATD, the current
ombuds received approximately fifty cases. On an average annual basis, he
estimates that the ombuds office sees approximately four to six percent of
the Service's 4400 employees. 91
Perhaps because of the confidentiality of the office, or perhaps because
of the acceptance and appreciation of the ombuds program, the SATD has
to date been aware of only one allegation of retaliation against an
inquirer. 92 The SATD immediately solicited the assistance of the supervisor
of the alleged retaliator. That supervisor spoke with the alleged retaliator,
underscoring the importance of the ombuds program to the agency and
ordering the retaliator to stop. 93
The views of offices with overlapping responsibilities were also
solicited for this Article. For example, the Service EEO manager was very
supportive of the ombuds office. He felt that the ombuds office was "very
effective." 94 Just the existence of the office conveyed a message to
employees that management cared. He and the SATD jointly conduct some
supervisory training and participate in minority task-force meetings. They
also confer on certain EEO related cases and the ombuds office will refer
cases as appropriate to the EEO office. According to the EEO manager, as
a result of the ombuds program, the number of cases the EEO office must
process has fallen. 95 The ombuds program has handled non-EEO cases that,
prior to establishment of the ombuds program, were entering the EEO
system. The decrease in these cases has led to increased availability of
resources in the EEO office for resolving and processing cases that have
clearer EEO implications. 96
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 Telephone Interview with Art Pettaway, supra note 58.
95 See id.
96 See id.
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The EAP coordinator was similarly supportive of the ombuds program.
He reported that when the office was established, he was relieved because
he had another ally and another source of help.97 He believes that the stress
that he and the employee seek to address often originates in workplace
problems. He and the ombuds program work together to help resolve
employees' problems. 98 At a first meeting between the employee and the
ombuds, the EAP coordinator might also attend. He could then either
continue to participate or simply refer the client to the ombuds. At other
times, the ombuds might seek the EAP coordinator's general advice or,
with the inquirer's permission, discuss a specific matter.99
B. United States Information Agency (USIA) International
Broadcasting Bureau (IBB)
1. Agency Description and Impetus for Creating the Ombuds
Office
USIA, established in 1953, is an independent foreign affairs agency
within the executive branch of the federal government. Its role is to explain
and support American foreign policy and to promote national interests
through a wide range of educational and cultural overseas information
programs. It has more than 200 posts in 143 countries. Its headquarters are
in Washington, D.C. USIA has approximately 7300 positions, fifty percent
of which are located overseas. The IBB, established in 1994, is a sub-unit
of USIA, comprised of the Voice of America (VOA), Radio and TV Marti
and WORLDNET Television. Voice of America's approximately 3000
employees broadcast more than 900 hours of programming weekly in forty-
seven languages to an international audience. 100 IBB is run by a bipartisan
Broadcasting Board of Governors, one of whom, the Director of USIA,
serves as an ex-officio member of the Board.1 01 There are currently three
unions in IBB: Association of Federal Government Employees (AFGE), the
largest union, American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and National
Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE).
97 See Interview with Ralph Biase, EAP Coordinator, supra note 88.
98 See id.
99 See id.
1(0 See U.S. IN1o. AGENCY, FACT SHEEr 1 (1996).
101 See NEws RELEASE, U.S. INFo AGENCY, RELEAE No. 047-95 (1995).
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In 1985, USIA established an ombuds office. The position was filled
initially by a political appointee who was not conversant with the
requirements of an ombuds office and, according to a member of the
executive board of one of the union locals, the executive board was
strongly against creation of the position. 102 The union was concerned that
an ombuds would negatively impact the union. At the time, USIA felt that
the union should be the employees' sole representative and that all the
problems of bargaining-unit employees should be funneled through the
union. USIA was concerned that if the employee sought assistance from the
ombuds rather than the union, resolutions would be inconsistent and not
handled pursuant to contractual parameters regarding time limits and
prescribed remedies. The office was very short-lived.
In 1988, the idea of an ombuds office again surfaced as a way to deal
with employee concerns in the VOA division within USIA. VOA was
concerned that the formal processes were not adequately addressing
workplace problems. Many employees perceived both the EEO office and
the unions to be ineffective and did not trust the personnel office to be
objective. Without any trusted avenue of redress, workplace disputes were
proliferating.
In May 1988, the former VOA Director of Administration, Robert
Henry, was selected to work part-time as the VOA ombuds to serve
employees of VOA and Radio Marti. 103 He reported directly to the VOA
Director. Establishing the office was an evolutionary process. Even though
The ombuds had developed a reputation for being fair and unbiased, he met
with a great deal of animosity in the beginning. The unions were very
concerned about creation of the office and perceived him as a management
tool to deny employees their rights. They even went so far as to
intentionally exclude him from meetings in which he arguably should have
participated and they told key union members to stay away from him. In
addition, middle to upper level management was wary about the office's
existence. 104
These problems occurred at least in part because the office was simply
created by the VOA Director without working to gain buy-in from the
unions, related offices and management. Over the next few years, The
102 See Telephone Interview with Marie Ciliberti, executive board member (Mar.
8, 1996).
103 See Interview with Robert Henry, supra note 38.
104 See id.
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ombuds was very careful to demonstrate that he was not antagonistic to the
union. Similarly, he stayed in close contact with labor relations officials
and solicited their advice and opinions. With respect to management's
concerns, The ombuds benefited from his more than twenty-five years with
the agency. He knew many of the managers personally and tried to bring
them into the process when he could legitimately do so. He shared
information to prevent surprises and tried to serve as an "early warning
system" to management while maintaining his neutrality and
confidentiality. Over a three-and-one-half to four-year period, The ombuds
began gaining the trust of the union, management, labor relations and
employees. As more inquirers came to him, the time demands caused the
job to grow into a full-time position.105
2. Mission and Structure of the Ombuds Office
The mission of the office as stated in its brochure is to serve as a
"neutral, impartial, and informal channel available to assist employees,
managers and supervisors at all levels throughout the Broadcasting Bureau
in resolving any work-related problem or issue that cannot be easily
resolved through normal channels." 106 The ombuds, however, does not
circumvent or replace established formal complaint, grievance, or appeal
procedures. Moreover, according to its brochure, it does not circumvent or
replace the functions of the Office of Civil Rights or the representational
responsibilities of the employee unions. 107 In fact, the brochure specifically
states that "[the] Ombudsman ensures that employees are fully aware of
their rights in asking for the assistance and/or representation of those
organizations in addressing and resolving problems." 08
The ombuds will encourage employees with problems to contact the
appropriate offices and organizations, such as personnel, Office of
Administration, civil rights and unions. 109 The ombuds does not act as an
employee representative or employee advocate in formal hearings or
105 See id.
106 USI INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING BUREAU, THE USIA INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING BUREAU OMBUDSMAN BROCHURE 1 [hereinafter USIA OMBuDs
BROCHURE] (on file with author).
107 See id. 8.
108 Id.
109 See id.
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grievance procedures, although he will refer employees to the appropriate
formal representational organizations. 110 "Success" for the ombuds is not
just resolution of matters but is also a response to problems in a way that
leads to better and faster communications among adversaries. In addition, it
functions as an effective "early warning system," keeping management out
of trouble.
The ombuds position is still filled by Henry, although the scope of his
responsibilities has expanded to include all of IBB, and he reports to the
Director of IBB. He has no staff and does all his paperwork and
administrative work himself. 1 '
3. Basic Elements: Confidentiality and Neutrality
Confidentiality is of utmost importance. The ombuds is a member of
The Ombudsman Association and practices in accordance with its code of
ethics. He guarantees absolute and total confidentiality to everyone with
whom he talks in all cases, except in cases of threat to the organization, its
employees or national security." 2 In developing his confidentiality policy,
The ombuds did not seek approval from any other divisions or units in the
agency." 3 He has developed a relationship with the Inspector Generals
Office whereby he will respond to requests for information only to the
extent that he can provide information that is not confidential. He has never
been subpoenaed to produce documents or testimony, but he has received
two requests for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) that
did not require disclosure of confidential information." 4 He did breach a
confidence once when he believed that an employee posed a threat to
another's physical safety. 115 The employee had previously made threats
against individuals and had brought a weapon into the workplace. The
ombuds relayed his concerns to the Director of Personnel who requested
110 See id. 10.
111 See Interview with Robert Henry, supra note 38.
112 See USIA OMBUDs BROCHURE, supra note 106, 4.
113 See Interview with Robert Henry, supra note 38.
114 See id.
115 Disclosure under these circumstances is consistent with The Ombudsman
Association's Code of Ethics.
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the security division to investigate the matter. The investigation yielded
information sufficient to dismiss the employee. 116
The ombuds has focused on confidentiality in other ways as well. The
ombuds office was recently moved from the VOA management wing
because clients were uncomfortable meeting him there. Since the ombuds
office has been moved, the number of inquirers has increased. 117 The
ombuds's answering machine is confidential and private, accessible only by
him. With respect to record retention, the ombuds has a pro forma
interview sheet that contains very basic information about an inquirer and
his or her concerns. He keeps this sheet and other relevant documents for
approximately one year. 118 After that time, he discards all information that
he deems confidential and retains the nonconfidential material indefinitely.
In addition, prior to receiving documents from an inquirer, the ombuds will
caution that, while he will try to protect the confidentiality of all
documents, he cannot guarantee that they may not be produced pursuant to
a FOIA request or subpoena. 119
In one instance, The ombuds experienced a rather significant challenge
from senior management to his neutrality. However, after seeking and
obtaining the director's support, the matter was resolved to his
satisfaction. 120 According to a union representative, the ombuds would be a
"good poker player." 121 He has a reputation for integrity and being able to
maintain his neutrality in attempting to resolve workplace conflict and in
participating in group task forces. This view was supported by the Deputy
Director of the USIA Office of Civil Rights and the EAP Counselor.
On a daily basis, the ombuds reports that he spends approximately 80%
of his time handling cases and calls that are person specific. In other words,
these are matters in which only the individual initiating the matter is
involved. 122 Approximately 5% of the ombuds's time is spent focusing on
systemic and policy change issues. He spends approximately 5% of his time
on promoting and publicizing the ombuds program and in training.
116 See Interview with Robert Henry, supra note 38.
117 See id.
1' See id. The ombuds has not consulted with the Agency Records Officer with
respect to the document retention and destruction schedule.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 Telephone Interview with Marie Ciliberti, supra note 102.
122 See Interview with Robert Henry, supra note 38.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Approximately 10% of his time is spent participating in meetings and task
forces that are not specifically related to any of the above. 123
4. Is It Working?
The current ombuds has not developed tools specifically for evaluation
purposes. He believes the value of his office is underscored by several
facts: first, he can cite to specific cases that he resolved and therefore did
not go forward; second, he interacts with enough people to know that they
feel positively about the program; and third, he continuously gets a high
number of referrals.124 Because he wants to ensure the continued existence
of the ombuds's function in the agency, he is starting to generate periodic
reports on a regular basis. He is also very conscientious about
communicating information regarding trends or other matters where he has
permission: in senior staff meetings, in his monthly meetings with the
Bureau Director and in weekly meetings with the Director of Personnel. He
prepares "ombudsman advisory notes" to senior management as needed,
and he sporadically maintains statistics on cases and inquirers, generically
without names. He receives approximately three to four new cases a week
and four to five general inquiries a day that he can answer in one phone
call. He also is involved in informal investigations that arise
sporadically. 125
The ombuds believes that inquirers come to him because they have not
been satisfied with other processes or because they do not trust the other
processes. He believes that his source of power stems from his relationship
to the Director. In addition, he has been a VOA/IBB employee so long that
people frequently know and trust him, and are keenly aware that he is quite
knowledgeable about the organization's functioning. His style is to try to
empower the inquirer to resolve the problem him/herself. When the
ombuds does become involved directly in problem resolution, he frequently
consults back with the inquirer. 126
The ombuds 's approach to an inquirer's concerns about reprisal is
instructive of his various approaches. First, if the inquirer would like the
ombuds to intervene in some way, but is uncomfortable with him using her
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id.
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name, he will take steps to minimize the likelihood of reprisal. He will very
informally contact others he knows in the same unit. If they have similar
complaints, he will approach the supervisor saying that several people have
indicated a concern. He then tries to understand the manager's perspective
and work out the problem. If there already have been allegations of
retaliation, he may speak with the manager directly and remind him that the
ombuds's role is to attempt to resolve matters, and that the manager's
actions are being viewed as harassment. If that is not successful, he may
warn management that a manager's actions could make the situation worse,
and that the actions need to stop. If the manager is not responsive, The
ombuds will consult with the next level manager. From a systemic
perspective, The ombuds could raise the issue, with the Director's support,
at a senior staff meeting.127
Comments of individuals from overlapping offices support the
ombuds's view that his services are valued. The ombuds has spent a good
deal of his time trying to work with other offices to gain acceptance for the
program. For example, a member of a local union executive board views
the ombuds office as an ally. Although, she stated candidly, it was a little
bit like "two porcupines making love-you have to do it carefully." 128
From her perspective, the ombuds can assist the union in several ways. He
has access to records not available to the union; he can carry the union's
message to management in a less challenging manner; and he provides
another alternative to resolving employees' concerns and another "pressure
point" on management. It also gives her a "window into how hard
management will fight on an issue." 129 As a pragmatist, she says she
believes that resolving matters early on, with the ombuds's assistance, will
decrease the likelihood of retaliation that "is not far behind once an
employee files a formal grievance." 130 Conversely, the ombuds's relation
to the union benefits management because the ombuds can more accurately
serve as an early warning system to management when appropriate. The
union official feels that, overall, the ombuds has had a positive impact on
127 See id.
128 Telephone Interview with Marie Ciliberti, supra note 102.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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the ability of the union to function effectively because he could bring an
employee's perspective to management without concerns about reprisal.131
The Office of Civil Rights similarly values the ombuds's function in the
agency according to the Deputy Director of the USIA office, especially
because the number of EEO complaints that the office processes from IBB
is disproportionately high compared with the rest of the agency. 132 The
Deputy and the ombuds confer on specific issues, and the ombuds is a
member of the EEO Advisory Board. In addition, they coordinate if an
employee comes to one office and might benefit from speaking to the other.
At times, they will work jointly on a matter. The EEO officer expects that
the ombuds will generally refer EEO matters to her office. She
acknowledges however, that if the employee chooses not to go to the EEO
office, it is appropriate for the ombuds to attempt to resolve the matter.
When she addresses employee and management groups, she even
distributes the ombuds brochures. She stated that the EEO caseload would
triple if it were not for the ombuds's assistance. 133
The EAP program representative, a psychologist who has been with
USIA since 1981, spoke positively of the ombuds office, stating it was
another outlet for employees to voice concerns. 134 In his view, while the
offices had overlapping interests, the ombuds office has slightly different
goals and is likely to be more influential with management than he would
be. The two offices often refer to each other, depending on whether the
131 See id. While the union representative was very positive about the ombuds
office, she believed that if the Labor Relations Office (LRO) were "doing its job," the
ombuds office would not be necessary. In fact, she felt a well-functioning LRO would
be preferable to an ombuds office because the LRO would have implementation and
monitoring authority lacking in an ombuds. In addition, she felt the ombuds was not
institutionalized. A new director might not support the position adequately, or a new
ombuds might not be as careful and neutral. According to the union representative, the
LRO is strongly pro-management and takes actions to develop a case against the
employee. This is not only unfair to the employee, it also increases the likelihood of
reprisal. She also expressed skepticism that the LRO could ever change adequately to
serve its proper function. This view is consistent with a typical ombuds function in
which the ombuds may substitute temporarily for parts of a dispute resolution system
that are not functioning well. See Rowe, supra note 52, at 359.
132 See Interview with Delia Johnson, Deputy Director of the Office of Civil Rights
(Mar. 11, 1996).
133 See id.
134 See Interview with Jim Wilcox, EAP Program Representative (Dec. 1995).
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concern is more personal or more workplace based, or they may work as a
team to try to resolve the problems. 135
C. Smithsonian Institution
1. Agency Description and Impetus to Create the Ombuds Office
The Smithsonian Institution, established in 1846 by an act of Congress,
consists of an education and research complex of sixteen museums,
galleries and a zoo. The Institution also has research facilities in eight states
and the Republic of Panama. The Smithsonian is governed by the Secretary
of the Smithsonian and a board of regents that is independent of the
government. Seventy-seven percent of its funding is through an annual
congressional appropriation. The Smithsonian has approximately 6700
permanent staff members. Approximately 2000 employees are trust-fund
employees and the rest are federal employees. 136 The union American
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) represents federal
bargaining unit employees within the Institution.
In 1977, senior management at the Smithsonian proposed creating an
ombuds office because growth at the Institution had negatively impacted
employee/management communication. In addition, various members of
management were concerned that trust-fund employees did not have the
legal protections enjoyed by the federal employees, potentially creating a
two-tiered system. Moreover, there was concern that employees might have
issues that did not fit into established forums for handling concerns.
Creating an ombuds office, it was thought, could address all these issues.
As envisioned by the Director of Personnel, who was active in the office's
creation and design, the ombuds was to be a part-time position reporting to
the Assistant Secretary for Administration. Initially, the strongest
opposition came from the union, which was distrustful of management's
purpose in establishing an ombuds office. The first ombuds was selected in
1977. The current ombuds, Chandra Heilman, was selected in 1983 and is
a member of the Office of the Under Secretary. The equivalent of a GS-
135 See id.
136 See OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SMTHSONIAN INSTITUTION FACT SHEET
(1996).
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13,137 she works four days a week in a sunny office hidden away in a
corner of the Arts and Industries Building. She has no staff and performs
all administrative work herself.138
2. Mission and Structure of the Ombuds Office
The Smithsonian ombuds is, according to its brochure, "a neutral party
to whom employees can bring any work-related problem, concern or
complaint that cannot be resolved through normal channels. The
ombudsman will respect confidentiality when requested, will listen to the
problem and discuss steps to take to help you reach a fair resolution." 139
In addition, she participates in systems change, catalyzed by both her
work with individuals and through her ad hoc discussions with other offices
within the Smithsonian that address human resources issues, such as the
Office of General Counsel, the EAP, the labor relations office and EEO.
The ombuds's definition of "success" is when she is aware that a situation
has improved both in terms of system change and for a particular
individual. 140
The ombuds handles a wide variety of cases throughout the country and
in Panama141 but ensures that employees are aware of formal processes that
exist within the agency. For example, if a bargaining unit employee solicits
her assistance, she will, with that employee's permission, notify the union
as to her involvement. If the union prefers to handle the matter itself, she
will back out unless the employee specifically requests that she continue to
assist him. She handles matters that are arguably EEO related in the same
manner. She will serve as an observer in a formal investigation, but she
will not conduct the investigation herself or submit a written opinion. 142
137 As of 1996, the salary of a full-time GS-13 in Washington is $54,629 to
$71,017. See Federal Research Service, tbl. 1997 General Schedule Pay Scale, FED.
CAREER OPPORTuNmTIEs, June 16-29, 1997, at 4.
138 See Interview with Chandra Heilman, supra note 37.
139 SMITHsONIAN INSTrrUTION, THE OMBUDSMAN... A SOURCE FOR SOLVING
YOUR PROBLEM 2 [hereinafter SM-IHSONiAN OMBUDSMAN BROCHURE] (on file with
author).
140 See Interview with Chandra Heilman, supra note 37.
141 While she is authorized to address concerns of employees who are not based in
Washington, D.C., most of these are handled through phone or fax rather than personal
contact.
142 See Interview with Chandra Heilman, supra note 37.
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As stated in the Smithsonian ombuds brochure, the ombuds operates in
several different ways: As a mediator, sounding board, neutral voice,
impartial ear, confidential advisor and resource for assistance. 143 She finds
that, over time, more and more managers are seeking her assistance and
advice regarding problems dealing with their supervisees. 144
The ombuds has had access to information as she has needed it. She has
regularly scheduled meetings with her supervisor who also apprises her
outside of regularly scheduled meetings of significant events or trends when
necessary. She also learns about trends and changes through her
participation in agency task forces such as the Women's Council, the EEO
Advisory Committee and the EAP Advisory Committee and, as discussed
above, through ad hoc meetings with other individuals who have an interest
in identification and resolution of workplace conflict. On a case-by-case
basis, she has requested information she has deemed necessary and has not
encountered any difficulties. 145
On a routine basis, the ombuds spends the vast majority of her time,
approximately 75%, dealing with resolution of cases brought to her
attention by individual employees, although she does engage in system
change activity approximately 5% of her time. She spends less than 5% of
her time promoting the ombuds program, speaking to new employee groups
and other programs, and occasionally arranging for articles in newsletters.
Unlike some federal workplace ombuds, she provides very little formal
training to employees or managers. The remainder of her time,
approximately 10-15% of her time, is spent participating in meetings, task
forces and other activities that are not specifically related to any of the
above.146
The ombuds believes that the source of her power to resolve matters
stems from her access to the Under Secretary and Secretary of the
Institution, if needed. Moreover, her supervisor has a great deal of
credibility within the Institution. Employees and managers seek her services
because she can help them talk about their problem. They value another
opinion from someone who is not involved in the dispute. She understands
the work situation and provides them with a rational, non-judgmental
143 See SMr SON OmtuDsMAN BROCHuRE, supra note 139, 3.
144 See Interview with Chandra Heilnan, supra note 37.
145 See id.
146 See id.
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voice. 147 Additionally, she believes she is not threatening to an employee or
manager. She issues no reports, she causes few rifts and she is generally
able to handle matters quickly and quietly. The functioning of the ombuds
office allows employees and managers to deal with issues directly; no one
beyond the parties needs to know what is happening. This may be why very
few inquirers have returned to her complaining that supervisors have
retaliated against them for having engaged the ombuds's services. 148
3. Basic Elements: Confidentiality and Neutrality
As with the other ombuds offices, The ombuds sees maintaining
confidentiality as a vitally important aspect of her function. She practices
according to The Ombudsman Association Code. She therefore maintains
confidentiality of all information unless there could be physical harm to the
inquirer or to others. If she perceives this to be the case, she will first
encourage the inquirer to come forward him/herself and report or seek
assistance, as appropriate. She has never broken a confidence because of
concerns about safety. 149
Supporting her concerns about confidentiality is her confidential
answering machine to which no one else has access and her locked office to
which there are only three keys: one is the ombuds', one is under seal in
the security office and one is in the secretary's safe. 150 She destroys her
notes periodically, about twice a year, and only maintains select statistical
information.' 5' She was subpoenaed to produce documents once, but,
because she had no responsive documents, the subpoena was never
enforced. She has never received a request under FOIA. Thus far, when
the EEO office or the Inspector General has requested information, she
disclosed information after obtaining authorization from the inquirer, or she
has had no documents to produce. The Inspector General has respected her
obligation to maintain confidentiality and has never forced her to breach
it.152
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See id.
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The ombuds could report no instances during which she felt her
neutrality was being seriously challenged by management. 153 Other
Smithsonian offices interviewed for this Article supported the ombuds's
consistent objectivity and neutrality. As the EAP Program Coordinator
stated, "I've seen her stand up to anyone!" 154 However, one office
mentioned that she is occasionally perceived by employees as part of
management.
4. Is It Working?
Because the ombuds is quite confident of senior management's support
of her office, she has not focused heavily on creating documents to justify
it. She does maintain generic statistics on its inquirers including gender,
grade level and whether the inquirer is a member of a minority group. She
found that the inquirers were fairly equally distributed in terms of gender
and grade level, and their racial and ethnic identities were consistent with
the Smithsonian population. She receives approximately 220 to 250 cases a
year. This number does not include contacts in which the ombuds can
provide the service or information requested during that particular
contact. 155
The office's success is confirmed by individuals in overlapping offices.
Each of the offices was very complimentary about the work of the ombuds
in general and the work of the current ombuds in particular. In fact, each
office questioned whether the outstanding work that has been performed
should be attributed to the role of the ombuds or whether it was a function
of this ombuds's personality. 156
According to the Deputy General Counsel at the Smithsonian, over the
years he has spoken with the ombuds on a sporadic basis when issues of
joint concern have arisen, respecting any confidentiality constraints she
may have. 157 In the past, the ombuds has called the Deputy General
Counsel to brainstorm in general or to discuss a specific problem that
153 See Id.
154 Telephone Interview with Dee Federick, EAP Program Coordinator (Dec. 19,
1995).
155 See Interview with Chandra Heilman, supra note 37.
156 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Jim Douglas, Smithsonian Deputy General
Counsel (Feb. 1996).
157 See id.
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requires immediate attention such as an employee threatening violence. The
Deputy General Counsel believes that the ombuds has made a significant
contribution to the agency for several reasons. The ombuds is able to bring
problems to a higher level of management than would normally become
involved. This may increase the incidence of resolution, provides
management with essential information that they may not have otherwise
received and helps to make employees feel that their concerns are being
taken seriously. The Deputy General Counsel also stated that the ombuds
office may have reduced the number of certain complaints being funneled
into the EEO Office. 158 Previously, workplace conflicts that were not EEO
based were brought to the EEO Office because there were no other avenues
for resolution. The ombuds office is able to address these concerns
informally with a more agency-wide perspective. In general, the Deputy
General Counsel concluded that the existence of the ombuds has reduced
the number of cases that reached the General Counsel's Office. 159
The Compliance Program Manager at the Smithsonian EEO Office
mentioned several ways in which the EEO Office and the ombuds office
work together. 160 They may jointly-or in conjunction with other offices
such as the EAP counselor, OGC, or personnel-send an unofficial paper
to the Under Secretary reporting trends in workplace issues that they have
identified. 161 The EEO Office will also refer individuals to the ombuds
office if the employee does not have an EEO-based complaint. The EEO
officer underscored that, without the ombuds office, the EEO Office would
likely have more complaints. 162 Because of the ombuds office, it was more
likely that the complaints that came into the EEO Office would have an
EEO basis since those that were more management based could go to the
ombuds for assistance in resolution. According to the Compliance Program
Manager, if an inquirer solicited the ombuds's assistance with an EEO-
related problem, she should refer the employee to the EEO Office. In the
event the employee preferred that the ombuds attempt resolution, the
ombuds should notify the EEO Office that she is handling an EEO matter,
but not disclose any names unless the inquirer authorizes her to do so. She
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See Telephone Interview with Bob Osborne, Smithsonian Compliance Program
Manager (Feb. 27, 1996).
161 See id.
162 See id.
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should continue to keep the EEO Office apprised as to the progress of the
matter. 163
The EAP Program Administrator at the Smithsonian stated that she
referred individuals frequently to the ombuds. 164 In so doing, she might
withdraw from the matter or, if appropriate, continue to see the client.
Alternatively, with the client's permission, she might just confer with the
ombuds. She saw the ombuds as a vital link among the union, EEO, EAP
and labor relations. 165 One of the special benefits of the ombuds office was
that "while an employee may not always be pleased with the outcome of
their conflict, they always walk away with their dignity." 166 Overall, she
felt the ombuds office made a beneficial contribution to the EAP program.
Without the program, the EAP would have to "get into a broader range of
issues; that would dilute the effectiveness of the EAP." 167
The Chief of Labor and Employee Relations stated that he and the
ombuds occasionally conducted informal investigations and that they
referred employees and managers to each other as appropriate.168 If a
manager sought assistance in how to take action against an employee, the
labor relations office was the appropriate place to provide that information.
If, however, the manager sought assistance in deciding how to deal with a
problem employee, he said the ombuds office might be a more appropriate
source of assistance. Because of the ombuds office, he believes that the
labor relations office has had a slight reduction in its caseload. 169
D. The Department Of Energy
1. Agency Description and Impetus to Create the Ombuds Office
The United States Department of Energy evolved from the United
States Atomic Energy Commission that was created in 1946 to direct the
design, development and production of nuclear weapons. In 1977,
163 See id.
164 See Telephone Interview with Dee Federick, supra note 154.
165 See id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See Interview with Dolph Sand, Chief of Labor and Employee Relations (Dec.
1995).
169 See id.
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Congress created the Department of Energy as a cabinet level department.
According to the Department's mission statement, the agency "provid[es]
the technical information and the scientific and educational foundation for
the technology, policy, and institutional leadership necessary to achieve
efficiency in energy use, diversity in energy sources, a more productive
and competitive economy, improved environmental quality, and a secure
national defense." 170 It supports a workforce of approximately 30,000,
many of whom are scientists and engineers located throughout the country.
There is currently one union, the National Treasury Employees Union at
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Over forty percent of the employees in
the Washington office are members of the bargaining unit. Other unions
exist in various field offices.
The Office of the Ombudsperson at the Department of Energy is the
youngest of the five case studies in this Article, having opened in late 1993
at the recommendation of the Secretary of Energy. The Secretary
established the office because the Department had a perceived history of
secrecy, abuse 171 and long-standing morale and other personnel
problems. 172 According to news reports, she believed it was a
"dysfunctional department." 173 The ombuds interviewed was the first
ombuds at the Department.
The office is still in its formative stage and is working to establish a
good reputation, relationships and trust with other Department offices.
When the office of the ombuds was established, the decision was solely
made on the secretary level. The union at the Department was not
consulted. Moreover, the secretary appointed an ombuds who was
unknown to the union or the agency. Consequently, the union was initially
concerned about the role of the ombuds and the potential of the office to
undercut the authority of the union. Discord with the union interfered with
the office's ability to function for almost four months. To address the
union's concerns, the ombuds has carefully worked with the union.
170 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, FUEuNG A COMPETrriVE
ECONOMY, STRATEGIC PLAN 2 (1994).
171 See Alan C. Miller, O'Leary Calls for a Review of her Practices, L.A. Tam,
Dec. 10, 1995, at A32.
172 See O'Leary's Friend and Aide Repays $21,200 in Expenses, ROCKY MTN.
NEWs, Jan. 14, 1996, at 6A. After conducting a complete investigation, the Department
determined that the ombuds had acted appropriately and refunded her money.
173 Alan C. Miller & Dwight Morris, The Travels of Hazel O'Leary, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1995, at Al.
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Whenever a bargaining-unit employee seeks her assistance, she will refer
the person to the union or encourage the person to seek clearance from the
union for her to handle the matter. 174
In addition, some of the individuals interviewed for this Article
perceived that the office was established without much publicity.175
According to the interviewees, this resulted in confusion on the part of
employees and management as to the ombuds's role and function. The lack
of clarity also caused some managers to express discontent about the
ombuds's "meddling."
The legal office also initially raised some concerns about the existence
of the ombuds office, especially with respect to the potential for an
employee seeking assistance from the ombuds to inadvertently miss time
deadlines in the formal grievance, union and EEO procedures. The EEO
Office, while generally supportive of the ombuds, was similarly concerned
about employees waiving their rights under EEO law because they might
inadvertently miss time deadlines. According to the ombuds, these concerns
have been resolved. 176
2. Mission and Structure of the Ombuds Office
As stated in the ombuds office brochure, the function of the office is to:
"provide an opportunity for employees and stakeholders to confer with a
neutral designee to discuss concerns, recommendations, and complaints
perceived to interfere with work, productivity or morale. "177
While the ombuds acknowledges the potential for engaging in systemic
change, her initial work has been primarily on individual cases. 178 She
174 See Telephone Interview with Shirley Thomas, Department of Energy Ombuds
(1996).
175 According to the ombuds, however, the Ombuds Office was announced in a
variety of employee communications with wide distribution. See id.
176 See id.
177 DEPARTMENT op ENERGY, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSPERSON 1 [hereinafter
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OmBuDSMAN BRoCHURE] (on file with author).
178 In a more recent conversation with the ombuds, six months after the first, she
related several efforts that she has begun in the area of systemic change. She has
brought the matter to the Secretary's attention and requested that a committee be formed
to review the matter and make recommendations. A committee has since been formed to
address the issue. See Second Telephone Interview with Shirley Thomas, Department of
Energy Ombuds (1996).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
believes that, in its initial stages, a successful ombuds office should be able
to provide quick, immediate service that underscores fairness. Although
most of her inquirers are from the headquarters office, the departmental
ombuds is available to all employees and managers to handle all different
forms of conflict. The ombuds, however, will not handle cases that have
been lodged as formal complaints, appeals, or grievances or those that are
in litigation. Also, as stated above, she will exercise great sensitivity in
dealing with bargaining unit employees who seek her assistance. 179
The current ombuds is a long time acquaintance of and reports directly
to the Secretary of Energy who hired her from outside the agency where
she served as a school social worker. She is the sole ombuds in the agency
with access to clerical assistance as needed.180 She has a very good
working relationship with the Secretary, which, while an apparent benefit,
has recently raised some questions in the press.'18
Interviewees perceived that the ombuds is able to obtain more
information directly from senior management than she might have
otherwise. She also is perceived to carry authority even though she has no
formal decision-making authority. Her access to information comes from
participating in weekly senior staff meetings and committee meetings,
having access to certain types of correspondence and, on occasion, walking
the halls and making herself available in the lunchroom. She has access to
any unclassified document in the agency, but she has not requested many to
date. 182
As stated in the brochure, the ombuds utilizes different methods in
attempting to address employee concerns: exploring alternative approaches
to achieve positive resolution; acting as a mediator in the resolution
process; and exploring other internal operations which may impact positive
179 See Telephone Interview with Shirley Thomas, supra note 174.
180 There are other individuals throughout the agency, exclusively in the regions,
who participate in an "employee concerns program" (ECP) on a collateral duty basis.
The regional collateral duty ECPs are authorized to listen to any type of problem and try
to resolve it early on in a dispute. They are, however, required to maintain records of
their conversations and dispute resolution efforts. There is no relationship between the
Department Ombuds and the regional ECUs.
181 From 1995 through 1996, the ombuds's friendship with the Secretary has been
frequently noted with disfavor in the national press as part of the GAO and
Congressional review of the Secretary's conduct since being confirmed to her post at the
Department. See, e.g., supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
182 See Telephone Interview with Shirley Thomas, supra note 174.
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resolution. 183 In the event an employee decides to use a formal process, the
ombuds will cease her involvement in the matter. According to the ombuds,
Department employees seek her services because she can offer
confidentiality. This is the first time the Department has ever provided such
a service, and she believes employees appreciate being in an environment
where they can differ, question and explore their feelings. She is unaware
of anyone claiming that they have been retaliated against for coming to
speak with her. 184
3. Basic Elements: Confidentiality and Neutrality
The Department ombuds practices in accord with The Ombudsman
Association Code. Accordingly, she would disclose information
communicated in confidence only if someone were threatening injury to
themselves, another person or property. 185 To date, she has never had to
breach a confidence and has not had any legal challenges to her
confidentiality.' 8 6 The location of her office currently does not provide the
necessary confidentiality/anonymity to inquirers. However, upon inquirer's
request, the ombuds will arrange meetings away from the office to ensure
anonymity. She disposes of personal notes as soon as the matter is resolved
and she does not maintain generic statistics at this point. 187 She articulated
concerns that instituting a tracking system, even one that does not include
names, could generate retaliation because managers might possibly be able
to identify individuals. 188
In terms of any challenges to her neutrality, the ombuds stated that she
is in a unique position in that she is on sabbatical from her job in another
183 See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OMBUDSMAN BROCHURE, supra note 177, 5.
184 See Telephone Interview with Shirley Thomas, supra note 174.
185 See generally OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 1.
186 See Telephone Interview with Shirley Thomas, supra note 174. She did have a
discussion with the legal department about the appropriateness of her being a member of
The Ombudsman Association Board of Directors, including her ability to practice to the
TOA Code of Ethics. Apparently, she allayed their concerns after explaining her role
and the role of the Ombuds within the agency.
187 See id. The agency has determined that her personal notes are not official
records.
188 See id.
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state and is more immune to pressure than she might be if this ombuds
position were her sole option.' 8 9
4. Is It Working?
At this point, the ombuds has not yet begun routinely maintaining
statistics on inquirers, the complaints that they bring forward or drafting
reports. She does not feel the need to generate any formal records or
reports on the functioning of the office. She is confident of the Secretary's
support and keeps her abreast of relevant information as necessary while
maintaining the inquirer's confidentiality. 190 Further, she believes that the
benefits of an ombuds office are not reflected in mere statistics, and that
numbers and cost analyses do not convey the real benefits to the
organization. For example, she believes that just the continued existence of
the office is therapeutic to the organization, sending a caring message.
Handling cases in a timely "win-win" manner is also relatively new and
positive for the agency. 191
With respect to her interactions with other offices within the agency,
the Director of the Office of Dispute Resolution, the local union president
and the Acting Deputy Director for Civil Rights and Diversity (EEO
Officer) were interviewed. When the ombuds position was initially
established, the EEO Officer was concerned that inquirers at the ombuds
office might miss EEO time deadlines. 192 After working with the office, he
now believes that the ombuds office serves an important purpose of
resolving conflict at the earliest stage. He was also supportive in that, prior
to establishing the ombuds office, many cases that the EEO Office spent
resources processing did not really belong in its office because it did not
present claims cognizable under EEO law. 193 These employees entered the
EEO process because there were no other alternatives in the agency to
attempt to address and resolve their concerns. Since it was established, the
ombuds office has been able to handle and resolve many of these cases.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See Interview with Willie Garrett, Deputy Director for Civil Rights and
Diversity (Dec. 1995).
193 See id.
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The EEO Officer also saw a benefit in the ombuds's ability to act as a
"Department Traffic Cop," helping employees to identify the proper forum
for resolving conflict. 194 He did express concern that, because of the
newness of the office, employees lacked clarity as to the role and functions
of the office and how its services differed from those of other dispute
resolution offices. He is pleased with the relationship between him and the
ombuds. They jointly discuss workplace problems where appropriate and
consult with each other as needed. They may discuss someone in the
complaint process provided that they can do so without, breaching
confidentiality.
The Director of the Office of Dispute Resolution was also supportive of
the program. She believed that providing employees an opportunity to vent
or to try to resolve problems in a confidential arena was an important
agency resource. 195 She also noted that the ombuds benefits the ADR
Program because she is able to deal with individual concerns that otherwise
would go to the Office of Dispute Resolution, inappropriately requiring an
allocation of substantial resources. 196 Additionally, she viewed the ombuds
office as a potential source of referrals for the Dispute Resolution Office. 197
She did note, however, that, in retrospect, the experiences of the DOE
Ombuds Office underscored the importance of including in an ombuds
system design discussions with the union, adequate publicity and
clarification and understanding of the role and function of the ombuds.198
The President of the Washington Chapter of the National Treasury
Employees Union (NTEU) stated that, sometime prior to the establishment
of the ombuds office, the union had recommended the establishment of
such an office because it believed that energy employees who were not
members of a bargaining unit did not have adequate channels of redress.199
In addition, employees expressed concerns in areas where the union did not
have jurisdiction. However, the union was initially perturbed when the
office was established without involving them in the design process.
Moreover, they were concerned that the Secretary filled the position with
194Id.
195 See Telephone Interview with Phyllis Hanfling, Director of the Office of
Dispute Resolution (Jan. 1996).
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See Interview with Ellis Maupin, President of Chapter 213 of the Washington
Chapter of the National Treasury Employees Union, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 1996).
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someone the union did not know. In the beginning, because of her lack of
familiarity with the union and governmental processes, the current ombuds
attempted resolution of matters that the union believed were more
appropriately handled by the union. The union considered charging the
Agency with engaging in unfair labor practices. 200
To everyone's credit, the ombuds and the union president began
communicating their concerns about conflicting rights and jurisdiction.
Based on his discussions with the ombuds, the union president persuaded
the union not to go forward with its legal actions. He is currently pleased
with their interactions: after all, "[t]here is no shortage of business." They
do not always agree, but he "has nothing but respect for [the ombuds] as a
person and a professional." 201 The ombuds has been very careful to ask for
union advice on handling a matter while maintaining confidentiality and
will refer matters to him when appropriate. They will sometimes jointly
attempt to resolve a matter. The union president believes that, overall, the
ombuds has made a positive contribution to the agency.2°2 He knows from
personal experience that some individuals who had previously felt
disenfranchised now believe they have a place where someone will listen to
their concerns, whether or not their problems are resolved. 20 3 The office
has also benefited the union in that previously, employees would seek
assistance from the union for matters that were not within the union's
jurisdiction. The union now has some place else to send them. If he were
able to make changes in the ombuds office, the union president would like
the ombuds to have power to enforce changes rather than just recommend
actions.
E. Department Of State
1. Agency Description and Impetus to Create the Ombuds Office
The Department of State, another cabinet-level agency, is the oldest of
the agencies studied, having been established in 1789.2 04 As the country's
lead foreign affairs agency, the Department formulates, represents and
200 See id.
201 Id.
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 See OFFICE OF FED. REG., THE UNrrED STATES GOvERNmENT MANuAL (1995).
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implements the President's foreign policies. In addition, several related
foreign affairs agencies, including USIA, are under the general direction
and overall foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. It carries out
its mission through 250 diplomatic and consular overseas posts, its
Washington, D.C. headquarters and other offices in the U.S. 20 5 Its 15,500
employees are divided into approximately forty percent career civil service
and sixty percent foreign service personnel. 20 6 Within the Department,
there are three unions: the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA),
established in 1924 as a professional association and as a union in 1973
representing 7900 bargaining unit foreign service personnel;20 7 the National
Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE), elected in 1985 and representing
approximately 640 employees; and the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE), elected recently in July 1995 and
representing approximately 3000 bargaining unit employees. 20 8
In a manner distinctive among federal workplace ombuds, the ombuds
at the Department of State was established by the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act in 1987.209 At the time, Congress was concerned about
the growing inequality among two classes of employees at the Department:
the foreign service employees who received more favorable opportunities
and promotions, and the civil service. Congress established the ombudsman
position based on its findings that:
(1) the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department of State is
dependent not only on the contribution of Foreign Service employees but
equally on the contribution of the 42 percent of the Department employees
who are employed under the Civil Service personnel system;
205 See U.S. DEP'T OF SR. BuREAu OF AFF., Tim U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE:
STRucrtm AND ORGANiZATION (1995).
206 See Telephone Interview with Rita Glover, United States Department of State
(Mar. 19, 1996).
207 See Telephone Interview, Director of Membership, American Foreign Service
Association (Mar. 22, 1996).
218 See Telephone Interview, Labor Management Negotiator, United States
Department of State (July 15, 1996). This figure includes approximately 300 bargaining
unit employees who gained recognition prior to 1995. See id.
209 See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L.
No. 100-204, § 172(c), 101 Stat. 1331, 1359 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2664(a) (1994)).
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(2) the contribution of these Department's Civil Service employees
has been overlooked in the management of the Department, and greater
equality of promotion, training, and career enhancement opportunities
should be accorded to the Civil Service employees of the Department; and
(3) the goal of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 was to strengthen the
contribution made by Civil Service employees of the Department of State
by creating a cadre of experienced specialists and managers in the
department to provide essential continuity. 210
These concerns about the inequality of treatment of Department civil
service employees were especially heightened because the Department was
facing severe budget cuts. 211 To underscore these concerns, Congress
directed the Secretary to "take all appropriate steps to assure that the
burden of cuts in the budget for the Department is not imposed
disproportionately or inequitably on its Civil Service employees."212
Accordingly, the legislation established, in the Office of the Secretary
of State, the position of Ombudsman for Civil Service Employees, and
required that it be a career reserved position with the Senior Executive
Service (SES). 213 The ombuds is also required to report directly to the
Secretary of State and has the right "to participate in all Management
Council meetings to assure that the ability of the Civil Service employees to
contribute to the achievement of the Department's mandated responsibilities
and the career interests of those employees are adequately
represented . "214
210 22 U.S.C. § 2664(a) (1994).
211 See Catherine Brown, Report on the Civil Service (Mar. 8, 1995) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Department of State Ombuds Report].
212 Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 § 172.
213 A position in the SES is any position in a federal agency which is classified
above GS-15 that is not required to be filled by an appointment by the President and in
which an employee has certain supervisory responsibilities. By definition, it excludes
any foreign service position. See 5 U.S.C. § 3132(a)(2) (1994). The pay range as of
1996 for an SES in the Washington, D.C. area is $100,526 to $122,688. See
Department of State Ombuds Report, supra note 211.
214 Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 § 172. According to the
ombuds report, the Management Council no longer exists. However, the ombuds seeks
other vehicles through which to fulfill her statutory objectives. See Department of State
Ombuds Report, supra note 211.
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2. Mission and Structure of the Ombuds Office
The mission and philosophy of the office embraces these tenets:
ensuring that civil service concerns are identified and properly weighed by
decision-makers; helping civil service employees and their supervisors,
whether civil service or foreign service, to assume primary responsibility
for promoting individual career mobility and advancement; maintaining an
open door policy; providing honest and straightforward answers to
employee questions about career opportunities, training and other personnel
matters; and protecting the confidentiality of employees and supervisors
who seek the ombuds's counsel. The ombuds's "mandate" is to advise the
Secretary and senior Department management on civil service issues and to
represent the career interests of civil service employees.
According to the former ombuds, "success" for the office occurs when
mainstream management and personnel bureaus do a good enough job that
her function is unnecessary. 215 She stressed that the ombuds at the
department is a voice for a clearly defined constituency but without
operational responsibilities. 216 She also noted that, unlike most workplace
ombuds, she is considered a part of management. The focus of her job is
the "big picture."217 On the average, the ombuds and her special assistant
spent the lion's share of their time, approximately 70%, focusing on
systemic issues and policy change. Approximately 20% is spent handling
cases that are specific to one individual. The remaining 10% is spent
promoting and publicizing the ombuds program and training employees.218
They focus on the big picture by serving as senior advisor to the Secretary
and senior Department management on matters pertaining to the utilization
of the civil service workforce, conducting evaluations and analyses of
matters relevant to the promotion of the civil service workforce,
215 See Interview with Catherine Brown, Department of State Ombuds (Nov. 29,
1995).
216 See id.
2 17 Id. She acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, her dual roles could
create a conflict of interest situation because, as the Assistant Legal Advisor for
Consular Affairs, she supervises employees and provides legal advice to others who
may also need ombuds's services. However, she was unaware of any specific problems
her two hats had created; previous ombuds were in similar situations and had not
reported any problems, and, in the event of a conflict, the special assistant would be
available to handle the matter. See id.
218 See id.
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maintaining an awareness of matters of concern to civil service employees
by consulting with employee representatives and maintaining an open door
for expression of ideas and reporting to the Secretary on activities having a
significant impact on civil service emplpyment. 219
The ombuds is available for most workplace issues, although the
majority of the issues focus on career enhancement for civil service
employees. Most inquiries outside of Washington, D.C. are addressed
through nonclassified e-mail or on the telephone. The ombuds will not
supplant other existing offices or functions such as EEO, grievance, or the
newly elected union. The office will rarely become directly involved in
resolution of the problem. It will, however, brainstorm with individuals
regarding these and other options. Because the civil service union was
elected less than one year ago, the ombuds's office is particularly sensitive
about assisting bargaining-unit inquirers. 220
Notwithstanding the legislative mandate, the first ombuds was not
selected until November 1989. Since inception, the ombuds has been a
career SES member, generally serving in a collateral-duty capacity for
roughly two years, with the assistance of a full-time special assistant, a GS-
14 career civil service employee. The current ombuds, an SES in the Office
of the Legal Advisor, is the third to serve. Her term began in November
1993. She estimates that, on the average, she spends less than twenty hours
a week on her ombuds-related responsibilities. Her special assistant, with
almost twenty years experience in the Department, has served in this
capacity since the inception of the ombuds program.221
Because the ombuds is a collateral-duty position, the ombuds is
theoretically available for counseling individual employees, but the bulk of
the contacts come through the special assistant. She will solicit the
ombuds's help in the "sticky" cases: the ones in which the agency was "not
doing things right." 222 The ombuds focuses more on systemic change
issues, participating in committees, task forces and writing related reports.
The ombuds receives relevant information both from employees and
management in connection with her ombuds role and in connection with her
senior legal position in the agency. She participates in senior staff meetings
and strategic management initiative meetings; she attends certain personnel-
219 See id.
220 See id.
221 See id.
222 Id.
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related meetings and chairs the Civil Service Advisory Committee. Neither
she nor her assistant have requested individual personnel or similar records
because inquirers typically bring all relevant documents to the office
themselves. 223
In general, the ombuds and her special assistant believe that each
employee, not the ombuds office, is responsible for the development of her
career. Nor does the ombuds office generally act as advocates for any
particular individual. Accordingly, the special assistant will help inquirers
explore options and will perform some research where necessary. She may
also help to cut through bureaucratic red tape. However, she will rarely
become involved as an intermediary to try to resolve the matters brought to
her.224
3. Basic Elements: Confidentiality and Neutrality
Confidentiality is essential to the working of the office. The only time
that the ombuds or special assistant will breach confidentiality is in the
event of danger to self or property, or major fraud. They have never
disclosed information without authorization from the inquirer. 225 The office
has a combination lock known only to the ombuds, the special assistant and
the executive office. There is a confidential answering machine and any
sensitive matters are routinely locked in a safe in the ombuds's office where
documents are not retrievable by name. When a case is completed,
documents are returned to their owner or destroyed and a periodic review
and destruction occurs at least once a year. The only documents that are
retained are those alleging systemic problems or extraordinarily egregious
misconduct that might have systemic implications. There is no clerical
support to the office. 226
The office has had several tests of its policy of confidentiality from
both the grievance and EEO programs. In each instance, the inquirer was
the individual requesting information. Accordingly, the office was able to
disclose the information and documents with the clear authorization from
the inquirer and without disclosing information regarding other people.
223 See id.
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 See id. The ombuds office has not consulted with the Agency Records Officer
regarding record retention.
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They have discussed potential disclosure issues and possible defenses to any
document or information request with the legal department. 227
4. Is It Working?
The ombuds's position description requires her to submit an annual
report to the Secretary on "all activities which have had a significant impact
on civil service employment." 228 The annual report should also include
recommendations for activities which serve as goals and objectives the
following year. The annual report submitted by the current ombuds was
described by one interviewee as "gutsy." 229 In the thirty-page single-spaced
report, with an additional ten pages of related statistics, the ombuds
analyzed the current status of the civil service workforce in the Department
and made several recommendations designed to improve the current
situation.230 Within each she offered concrete suggestions as to how to
achieve the recommended actions.
The office does not maintain statistics with respect to its handling of
addressing the concerns of individual civil service inquirers. However, the
special assistant estimated that she speaks primarily with high-level support
staff and mid-level professionals and that she sees more female than male
inquirers. On the average, she sees three to five cases and fields about
twenty calls a week. 231 Recently, some agency managers have been
questioning whether the ombuds's office is still necessary given the recent
union election. The ombuds office and union are in transition, still
exploring roles and how they might work together. It is clear, however, at
227 See id.
228 Id.
229 Department of Energy Ombuds Report, supra note 211.
230 See id. The primary recommendations included focusing on the need to ensure
greater utilization of career civil service employees in leadership positions; to protect
SES opportunities for the career civil service; to ensure greater job rotation of the civil
service to deepen its skills and increase its versatility; to improve the human resource
management and other skills of both the foreign and the civil service; to move ahead
with information management initiatives that will permit informed and effective human
resource management by the Department as part of an overall strategic planning effort;
and to protect civil service career interests and to address human concerns in any plans
to restructure or downsize the Department. See id.
231 See Interview with Rosalie Dangelo, Special Assistant to the Ombuds (Nov. 29,
1995).
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the very least, that the ombuds has a function of working with civil service
management to maximize career growth and development, not duplicated
by the union. The ombuds's and union's perspectives differ as do some of
their goals. In addition, the ombuds can offer informality and
confidentiality not generally available in a union setting. Clarification,
however, is not likely to occur overnight.
According to the special assistant, individuals solicit the ombuds's
assistance for several reasons: the office will maintain confidentiality; the
inquirers are often able to obtain answers they are unable to obtain
elsewhere; the inquirers can gain clarity on issues of
employee/management rights; and the inquirers will receive creative,
knowledgeable assistance in brainstorming options. 232 Moreover, they are
able to ask for help without fear of reprisal.233 While the ombuds has
experienced a few managers who prefer that employees not go outside line
management with problems, there has been a low incidence of reprisal. The
special assistant thought that the low incident of reprisal might be a result
of their program marketing that stresses confidentiality and concerns about
employee welfare. 234 In those rare instances where she has encountered
allegations of retaliation from an inquirer, she has not taken any direct
action. Rather, she has supported the employee's efforts and worked with
him or her to make their interactions less visible, such as meeting in a
location that will ensure the inquirer's anonymity. In addition, she or the
ombuds may work indirectly to educate supervisors to view positively the
ombuds's role. 235
Management solicits the ombuds's assistance to learn about employees'
concerns and to gauge how employees will react to anticipated events.
Managers may also call for advice with respect to a particular situation.
For this Article, members of other offices with overlapping
responsibilities were interviewed, including the Associate Director for EEO
and Civil Rights, an employment-counselor from the career-development
resource center, and the Director of Grievance Bureau of Personnel. Each
strongly supported the ombuds office and the particular individuals
232 See id.
233 See id.
234 See id.
235 See id.
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currently staffing it.236 The Associate Director for EEO and Civil Rights
strongly believed that the ombuds office benefited the EEO Office because
it could address matters that the latter had difficulty addressing. 237 As in
other agencies, the ombuds office provides an avenue for employees to
seek assistance for non-EEO matters. Prior to establishing the ombuds
office, the EEO Office handled those matters, expending valuable resources
that should have been spent processing EEO-related concerns. The EEO
officer recognized that the structure of having a collateral duty "SES'er" in
the ombuds's position could theoretically create a conflict of interest
situation, but he expressed support for the current ombuds's ability to
handle the situation appropriately. He thought the ombuds was an effective
voice to senior management, acting like a "conscience." 238 He was content
with the nature of interaction between the EEO and ombuds offices
although he expressed an interest in developing a greater exchange of
information regarding such issues as "hot spots" and repetitive
problems. 239 He had no objections to the ombuds office attempting
resolution of an EEO-related case as long as the employee chose that option
and was aware of EEO timelines and consequences for failing to meet those
deadlines. In addition, he and the ombuds jointly sit on several task forces
and occasionally discuss areas of overlapping interests. 24°
The Director of Administrative Grievance acknowledged that she had
not had extensive interactions with the ombuds because the majority of her
work dealt with foreign service grievances.241 She estimated that, prior to
the union election, only twelve to fifteen percent of her cases came from
civil service employees. 242 With the advent of the union, she estimates a
further decrease in civil service complaints. 24 3 With respect to certain of
the civil service complaints, she said there has been some consultation,
236 See Interview with Thomas Jefferson, EEO Associate Director, in Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 11, 1995); Telephone Interview with Tanya Bodson, employment counselor
(Dec. 13, 1995); Telephone Interview with Joann Leshman, Director of Administrative
Grievance (Feb. 21, 1996).
237 See Interview with Thomas Jefferson, supra note 236.
238 Id.
239 See id.
240 See id.
241 See Telephone Interview with Joanne Leshman, supra note 236.
242 See id.
243 See id.
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especially if the ombuds had been previously involved in the matter.244 She
has received some referrals from the ombuds office and believes that the
ombuds office may have helped to resolve certain matters that otherwise
would have come to her office.245 In the future, with significant agency
redesigning, she anticipates she may have more involvement with the
ombuds office, especially in "big picture" areas in which the ombuds's
perspective may be helpful to ensure fairness, to put forward concrete
recommendations for management improvements and to increase
communication between management and civil service employees. 246
A professional career counselor at the Department's Employee
Counseling Office was also interviewed for this Article. She strongly
supported the creation of the Department ombuds office because civil
service had no access to individuals to help in career development. 247 There
have been referrals between the two offices. She refers to the ombuds if she
believes there is a problem with personnel or a supervisor, or if it appears
that a civil service employee's rights are being violated. The special
assistant has referred employees for counseling if she believes that the
individual would benefit from "stepping back and looking at their career
options." The offices also co-sponsored some workshops and hope to
develop more.2
Perhaps the best ombuds program evaluation, however, comes from
one of the interviewees who spontaneously offered that the agency was
"very lucky" to have the ombuds and her special assistant.249
V. ESTABLISHING A FEDERAL WORKPLACE OMBUDS OFFICE
A. Benefits of an Ombuds to a Federal Agency
The interviewees for this Article consistently pointed to several key
benefits of an ombuds office within a federal agency. Perhaps the most
consistent benefit addresses difficulties that appear to be uniformly
experienced in agency EEO Offices. Without an ombuds, most agencies do
244 See id.
245 See id.
246 See id.
247 See Telephone Interview with Tanya Bodson, supra note 236.
248 See id.
249 See id.
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not provide mechanisms for employees to resolve workplace disputes short
of initiating a formal action. In a nonunion agency, the only two options are
the administrative grievance process or the EEO Office. Interviewees
frequently mentioned that employees are reluctant to use the administrative
grievance program because federal personnel offices are so often identified
with management interests. In an agency with a union, bargaining unit
employees have a third option, but not all unions provide informal
resolution options or have the authority to address all possible concerns.
Therefore, EEO Offices are faced with numerous employees with bona fide
workplace problems which are not EEO-based claims. Yet such employees
are forced to seek resolution assistance from EEO Offices. These
employees contort their facts to fit the EEO mold, or simply acknowledge
their difficulties and plead for help because "they have no place else to
go." 250 In addressing these employees' concerns, the agency EEO Office
utilizes valuable resources, delaying the time within which complaints with
colorable EEO concerns are processed and possibly negatively impacting
on the office's credibility within the agency.
Interviewees in other offices with overlapping responsibilities similarly
expressed support for the agency ombuds office. In some instances, they
believed that it beneficially reduced their caseload. In other instances, they
strongly appreciated the collegiality of someone with whom they could
brainstorm about specific workplace issues. Still in other instances, they
believed that it augmented their function by providing a link with senior
management that they would not have otherwise enjoyed.
Ombuds and other interviewees also consistently expressed their belief
that the mere establishment of an ombuds office was a strong signal to
employees that management cared about resolution of their problems. 251
Finally, interviewees stressed the importance of providing an office where
employees could seek assistance in confidence. Concerns about retaliation
appear to be fairly prevalent among federal sector employees. For example,
for fiscal year 1996, reprisal was the most frequently alleged basis for
discrimination in a federal EEO complaint, as 19.7% of all bases so
alleged.252 Even so, only one of the five ombuds reported experiencing
250 This is not in any way intended to suggest that all EEO cases fall into this non-
EEO category.
251 Because no employees, qua employees, were interviewed for this Article, there
is no confirmation of the accuracy of this statement.
252 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTuNITY COMMISSION, 1996 EEOC FED.
SECTOR REP. ON EEO CoMPLAINTs & APPEALS, BY FED. AGENCIES FOR FISCAL YEAR
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instances in which inquirers presented allegations of retaliation for having
consulted with the ombuds.
Although these were the primary, consistently cited benefits,
interviewees cited other benefits as well, many of them focusing on the
ombuds's ability to serve as a management feedback mechanism-an early
warning system-to make management's job easier. For example, one
ombuds related a story in which he became aware that several employees
from one division began appearing at his doorstep, one at a time. He was
surprised because that division had previously not experienced many
workplace problems. Each employee's productivity was decreasing, and the
office was experiencing a variety of problems from failure to meet time and
attendance requirements to poor performance. The ombuds, because of his
familiarity with many of the inquirers, began spending time walking the
corridors within the division. Within a short time, he heard a rumor that the
agency planned to announce layoffs imminently and that the division was
going to be the first and hardest hit. Because of his access to senior level
management, the ombuds was able to confirm that no layoffs were planned
for the immediate future and that the division was certainly not on the "hit
list." He communicated this information to the senior management within
the division and recommended that they address the employee's layoff
concerns directly in staff meetings. This was done, and the tide of
employees to the ombuds's office receded. 253
Several interviewees also noted the value of the ombuds's ability and
interest in functioning as a systemic change agent. Among those agencies in
which representatives from different offices met and discussed trends in the
workplace, interviewees were appreciative of the ombuds's availability,
perspectives and access to senior management. One ombuds related several
instances related to his role as a systemic change agent regarding the
agency's employee rating system. He began noting that dozens of
employees were complaining that they were surprised by the ratings in their
annual evaluations. After informally investigating, he learned that, in
general, agency management did not conduct mid-year evaluations with
their supervisees. The ombuds drafted an advisory memo to senior
managers alerting them to his findings and recommending that mid-year
evaluations be required. The Director of Personnel monitored his
recommendation and required managers to perform mid-year evaluations.
1996 24 (1996). As of the date of publication, the 1997 statistics were unavailable from
the EEOC.
253 See Interview with James Lucey, former Secret Service ombuds (1995).
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The ombuds also plans to monitor the complaints he receives during the
next cycle of evaluations to determine whether the new practices actually
impact the types of complaints he receives. 254
The ombuds also noted that many of the inquirers were complaining
that they were unfairly rated. On review, he realized that one particular
factor, "team effort," was the area where these complainants were
penalized. 255 His informal research suggested that the "team effort" factor
had been cast into a "praise-the-boss" criteria.256 He therefore is
recommending that, although the factor was included for legitimate
purposes, it be removed or altered to minimize its abuse.257
Thus, an agency or division would most benefit from establishing an
office of the ombuds under the following circumstances:
1. If an agency EEO office is beleaguered with complainants
who are not presenting arguable EEO matters, and this is
deleteriously affecting the office's ability to function, either because
of insufficient resources or reduced credibility, an ombuds may be
able to handle some of the complainants;
2. If an EAP office is receiving workplace complaints that are
outside the EAP office's mandate, an ombuds might be beneficial;
3. If the current agency dispute resolution offices are not
adequately addressing workplace-related concerns, an ombuds may
be able to increase efficiency by unofficially coordinating efforts
between and among offices, in addition to being an alternative
resource for airing and resolving workplace concerns;258
4. If employee morale is low, establishing an ombuds office
might be perceived as an indicator of management concern about
employees' welfare;
254 See Interview with Robert Henry, supra note 38.
255 See id.
256 See id.
257 See id.
258 Especially as workplace diversity grows and individual values differ, having
alternative choices and options for complainants to express concerns or pursue
grievances in the workplace will be especially important. See generally Mary P. Rowe,
Options and Choice for Conflict Resolution in the Workplace, in NEGOTIATION:
STRATEGIES FOR MuTuAL GAIN (1993).
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5. If communications between employees and management are
suffering and conflict is proliferating because of misunderstandings
or misperceptions, an ombuds may be beneficial at both a systemic
and individual level;
6. If management is caught by surprise by the emergence of
significant workplace issues, an ombuds may minimize surprises by
providing management feedback;
7. If management and unions are constantly at loggerheads, an
ombuds may be able to provide an unofficial, but very helpful,
communication link between the two parties;
8. If an agency has been faced with numerous claims of
retaliation, either through EEO or grievance procedures, or the
agency culture is such that employees are afraid to bring matters
forward for fear of retaliation, establishing an ombuds office may
provide an avenue through which complaints can surface with
fewer concerns about retaliatory conduct. 259
B. Designing the Ombuds Office
If the agency decides that an ombuds's function may be appropriate,
how should it be designed? How should the agency go about establishing
the office; what are the essential elements to be included in every design?
Experiences reported by several agencies suggest some answers. Generally,
the ombuds offices in this Article were created by a high-ranking
government official, perhaps in consultation with a few other high-ranking
officials, without broader solicitation of opinions. While this appeared to
have worked for some agencies, interviewees from at least two agencies
reported that the office experienced significant and arguably unnecessary
barriers and delays because of the agency's failure to solicit input from
stakeholders such as the union, employee groups and junior and mid-level
management, prior to establishing the office. This experience is consistent
with recent ADR design theory advising that, prior to initiation of ADR
259 Interviews with individuals familiar with ombuds offices in federal agencies
indicate that ombuds have also been helpful in resolving disputes addressing agency
FOIA requests, ethics violations and issues within the jurisdiction of the Inspector
General.
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programs, stakeholders' views and participation be solicited and integrated
as much as possible into the dispute resolution design.260
The second step is to identify key elements essential to the efficient and
effective functioning of an agency ombuds office. Interviewees repeatedly
underscored the need for confidentiality unless the inquirer waives that
right. Maintaining confidentiality is more complicated than might meet the
eye. Obviously, the ombuds must be an individual of integrity who
understands the need for confidentiality and is capable of not disclosing
information without authorizations. Maintaining confidentiality also
requires attention to such details as office, computer and telephone
security, office location and record retention/destruction schedules.
Another essential component is that an ombuds office be designed to
maximize the likelihood of its ability to maintain neutrality and
independence. Agencies have enabled their ombuds to meet these needs in
different ways. In one agency, not among the case studies, the ombuds was
chosen near the end of her career. In that way, the ombuds is less likely to
be concerned about making unpopular, but appropriate, choices. In all but
one, the ombuds office is run by a senior-level person, either a GS-15 or
an SES. Ombuds are not part of line management and, except in the State
Department, have no collateral line management duties or responsibilities
that might conflict with their ombuds's requirements. Finally, each of the
ombuds reports to a senior-level manager within the agency, again
minimizing the likelihood of challenges to neutrality. As one ombuds
described, a senior-level manager once attempted to influence the ombuds's
actions, and the ombuds was unable to resolve the matter himself.261
Because the ombuds reported directly to the director, he was able to seek
the director's assistance and immediately stop the inappropriate pressure.
At another level, design issues include such questions as: To whom
should the ombuds report? How should the ombuds be selected and what
qualifications should she possess? How will this office interface with other
agency personnel with workplace dispute resolution responsibilities? What
260 See, e.g., CATHY A. CosTANT No & CHRiSTINA L. SIcKLEs, DEsIGNiNG
MERcHANT CoNFucT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 49 (1996); WnuAM L. URY E" AL.,
GmErNG DIsPUTEs RESOLVED; DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COST OF CONFLIcT
(1988); Systems Design Work Group, Administrative Conference of the United States,
Dispute Systems Design Pre-Design Organizational Checklist (June 30, 1993) (on file
with author).
261 See Interview with Robert Henry, supra note 38.
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access will the ombuds have to information and documents within the
agency?
Based on interviewees' responses, placement of the ombuds office
within the agency hierarchy appears to depend on several factors. Most
ombuds and many other interviewees believed that the ombuds would be
most effective if she reported to the head of the agency or division. Because
the ombuds has no direct line authority, they believed that the higher the
link, the more persuasive the ombuds, both in perception and reality. Of
the five case studies, four reported to the head of the agency or division.
One did not; she did not express any frustrations with respect to this
arrangement, but she did note that her supervisor was very careful to keep
her apprised of developments, and she, at least theoretically, had access to
the agency director. This view is supported by the experiences of one
agency, not in the case study, in which the ombuds position was moved
from reporting to the agency head to the head of personnel. Under these
circumstances, the ombuds's ability to function was severely curtailed.
Selection of the ombuds is also an issue to be addressed. In four of the
five agencies, the ombuds was an experienced individual who had been in
the agency for a period of time. In one agency, the ombuds was brought in
from outside. 262 Only one ombuds had previously worked in a program that
furthered the mission of the agency. The other four came from support
functions such as human resources and mental health professions. None of
the individuals were previously familiar with the practice of ombuds.
However, the interviewees were almost uniform in their belief that the
ombuds must convey a sense of personal integrity, including the ability to
maintain confidentiality and neutrality, to listen and care without becoming
personally involved and to have a backbone to fight in those occasions
when it is necessary and appropriate.
262 Research suggests that a possible relationship exists between the amount of time
an ombuds has spent in an organization and the ways the ombuds's role is enacted. For
example, the ombuds who has greater "connectedness" to the organization is more
likely to be a "helping" ombuds, i.e., one who "invent[s] individualized solutions to the
problems people present." An ombuds who is newer to an organization and may not
have informal networks is more likely to be a "fact-finding" ombuds, i.e., one who
"investigate[s] whether proper procedures were followed and if there are plausible
explanations for a complaint." Based on the information gathered for this Article, other
factors such as type of educational background, relationship to and support of top
management and personal style may also impact how the ombuds's role is enacted. See
id.; see also Kolb, supra note 8, at 673.
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How the ombuds office will interface with other agency personnel and
offices appears to depend on several factors. In each agency, there is a very
strong sentiment that the ombuds's office should not be designed or
perceived as a substitute for formal agency processes such as EEO,
administrative and union grievances. It appears that once the ombuds has
developed a trusting relationship with the other offices-often a matter of
years of acute attention and care-the other dispute resolution offices will
unofficially allow the ombuds more flexibility in dealing with matters that
arguably belong in one of the other processes.
Another important issue in design is determining the ombuds's access
to information within the agency or relevant division. The ombuds found
different ways to obtain the information they needed to function effectively.
In the case studies, some of the ombuds participated in senior-level staff
meetings on a regular basis, others attended periodically and still others did
not attend.263 All ombuds participated in various agency task forces and
working groups that enabled them to gather relevant information. An but
one office had authority to request and obtain documents from any office in
the agency as necessary. The authority of one ombuds had never been
tested because she obtained all relevant personnel documents from the
inquirers themselves. Two ombuds were on a number of the agency's
distribution lists. Two of the ombuds obtained a great deal of information
by walking the halls and informally talking with employees. 264 Another
ombuds stated that she did not view that as contributing to the primary
function of her ombuds role. The lesson, it appears, is that each ombuds
must have adequate access to information. Specifically how that is
accomplished must be consistent with the agency's culture and the
ombuds's personal style.
C. Powers and Functions of the Federal Workplace Ombuds
None of the federal workplace ombuds had any authority to impose
decisions. This was a matter of concern to many of the interviewees from
263 Interviewees mentioned that participation in senior staff meetings was a double-
edged sword. It provided the ombuds with current information and issues of concern
within the highest levels of the agency. It also helped to create a better working
relationship between the ombuds and senior management. On the other hand,
interviewees voiced concern that participation could create a perception problem that the
ombuds was a part of management.
264 See supra notes 72, 182 and accompanying text.
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overlapping offices who believed that ombuds would be far more effective
if they had authority to impose resolution or change on a particular
individual, office or agency. 265 Even though the ombuds have no such
authority, they are frequently able to serve as change agents on both a
personal and systemic basis. Several ombuds mentioned that through their
processes, they worked to "empower" the inquirer to handle a concern
herself. Other interviewees from related offices noted that people
frequently followed the ombuds's recommendations merely because of the
ombuds's reputation for integrity and knowledge of the system and its
people. Finally, some noted that the ombuds derived power from her ability
to speak with the director. One interviewee in fact suggested that she would
benefit from a reporting relationship with the director.266
Although the ombuds's functions differed among the agencies, all
emphasized the importance of listening to individual workplace concerns
and empowering the inquirer as important components of the job. The
greatest differentiation among the offices was the extent to which the
ombuds worked as a systemic change agent. The ombuds at the Department
of State spent a considerable amount of her time working toward systemic
change. Of course, this time allocation was clearly consistent with her
statutory mandate. Other offices did not have such a mandate and appeared
to be sufficiently overwhelmed with individual cases that there was not as
much time available to devote to systemic change.267
D. Confidentiality
The question of confidentiality within the federal government, perhaps
more than any other, has the potential to create difficulties for the federal
265 According to Rowe, most ombuds who have practiced for a period of time
come to appreciate the potency of reason and persuasion, as opposed to the power to
impose decisions. Moreover, having the line authority to impose decisions likely would
compromise an ombuds's ability to function in a neutral, confidential fashion. See
Telephone Interview with Dr. Mary P. Rowe, supra note 13.
266 Although not specifically mentioned by the interviewees, an ombuds's power
and influence may also come from rewarding good management and productive
behavior, bringing bad behavior to the attention of more senior management, providing
an alternative to the use of force, setting the example of moral authority and evincing a
commitment to resolution or change. See Rowe, supra note 52, at 357-358.
267 This result may differ from research results which indicated that internal
ombuds typically spent a quarter to a third of their time as internal management
consultants, trainers and change agents. See id.
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agency ombuds. As noted frequently above, the ability to maintain
confidentiality is one of the immutable cornerstones of an ombuds office. 265
As a federal court has noted:
[c]onfidentiality of communications is essential to relationships between
the ombudsman's office and [the organization's] employees
and ... management. The function of the... ombudsman's office is [to]
receive communications and to remedy workplace problems, in a strictly
confidential atmosphere. Without this confidentiality, the office would be
just one more non-confidential opportunity for employees to air disputes.
The ombudsman's office provides an opportunity for complete disclosure,
without the specter of retaliation, that does not exist in the other available,
non-confidential grievance and complaint procedures. 269
In the federal context, however, this requirement has the potential to
conflict soundly with other federal statutory, regulatory and cultural
requirements. For example, the following situations could, theoretically,
compromise an ombuds's ability to maintain confidentiality: 270 a request
268 ACUS recommended that, with respect to confidentiality in establishing
regulatory ombudsman in federal agencies,
a. The... guidelines should protect communications to or from the
ombudsman in connection with any investigation .... as well as the ombudsman's
notes, memoranda and recollections, and documents provided in confidence to the
ombudsman. The... guidelines should provide protection against disclosure in
judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings....
b. An agency, when establishing an ombudsman, should explicitly disclaim
authority ordinarily, to discover or otherwise force disclosure of an ombudsman's
notes, memoranda or recollections, or of documents provided to the ombudsman in
confidence.
The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies, Admin. Conf. of the United States,
Recommendation 90-2, 1 C.F.R. § 247 (1993).
269 Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 572 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
270 Until recently, there was a growing body of case law that supported
establishing an ombuds privilege. In the federal courts, see, e.g., Kientzy v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 572 (E.D. Mo. 1991); Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp.
90, 92 (S.D. Iowa 1987). Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, expanding the scope of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 64 U.S.L.W. 4490, 4492 (U.S. June
13, 1996) (No. 95-266). This was thought to support the existence of the ombuds
privilege In June 1997, however, the Eight Circuit called the Ombuds privilege into
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under FOIA, 271 a request for information from the agency Inspector
General's office, 272 or an allegation to the ombuds of government waste,
fraud, or abuse outlining in convincing detail the inquirer's participation.273
Related to these claims is, again theoretically, the increased likelihood of
availability of documents because of the government's record retention
policy that makes no special provisions allowing for destruction of ombuds
case records in a timely fashion.274 That the ombuds in the case studies
were able to maintain confidentiality, both in terms of nondisclosure of
information and timely destruction of documents may be more a factor of
ignoring these regulations or thus far avoiding challenges, rather than
finding creative ways of complying.
From 1990 until its sunset in fall 1995, the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act275 partially addressed some of these problems. The Act,
passed largely through the efforts of the now-defunct ACUS, 276 established
a statutory framework for federal agency use of ADR. Although
ombudsmanry was not specifically identified as an ADR process, it was
question in Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790 (8th Cir.). The reach
of this decision is unclear because the decision appeared to turn in large part on the
paucity of evidence put forth by McDonell Douglas. Unlike the attorney-client
privilege, the ombuds privilege rests in the office, not the client.
271 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), requires that each
agency make available to the public requested documentation unless it falls within one
of nine exemptions contained in § 552(b). The potential problem is two-fold: typical
agency procedure requires a member of the General Counsel's Office to review
documents to determine whether exemptions apply, thus breaching confidentiality.
Second, this could potentially result in the disclosure of documents pursuant to the
request if no exemption applies. See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
272 Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. (1994).
273 See Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5
C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(11) (1997). This section requires that employees shall disclose
waste, fraud, abuse and corruption to appropriate authorities. See Standards of Ethical
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, § 2635. 101(b)(1 1).
274 See generally Federal Records Act, 44 U.S.C. cs. 21, 29, 31, 33 (1994);
National Archives and Records Administration, 36 C.F.R. § 1228.1-1228.224 (1997).
2 7 5 See generally Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-552, 104 stat. 2736 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583).
276 In 1995, Congress failed to authorize appropriations for ACUS. The
Conference closed its doors in October 1995. Under the Act, the Conference was
charged with implementation of the Act.
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generally assumed to be covered by the Act. 277 The confidentiality
provisions278 provided that a neutral and parties to a dispute resolution
proceeding were precluded from disclosing any information concerning a
dispute resolution communication unless the parties agreed, the
communication had already been made public, the communication was
"required by statute to be made public," or a court determined disclosure
was, on balance, necessary. 279 The Act did not help, however, in the event
of a FOIA request because Section 5740) explicitly stated that the Act was
not a statute specifically exempting disclosure under FOIA.
As one of its final acts before adjourning, Congress passed the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, and on October 19, 1996,
President Clinton signed it into law.280 The 1996 Act specifically includes
the practice of ombuds as a form of ADR.28l The Act increases protection
from disclosure under FOIA for dispute resolution communications
between a neutral and a party, while generally maintaining the
confidentiality provisions described above, except that it provides greater
protection from disclosure to dispute resolution communications generated
by a neutral. 282 There is one note of caution, however. Under the Act, the
confidentiality provisions are not triggered unless a "neutral is appointed,"
"specified parties participate" and the ADR process is "used to resolve an
issue in controversy. "283 "Issue in controversy" is further defined as "an
issue which is material to a decision concerning an administrative program
of an agency, and with which there is disagreement (A) between an agency
and persons who would be substantially affected by the decision; or (B)
between persons who would be substantially affected by the decision." 284
2 77 See OFIIcE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., THE
OMBuDsMAN: A PRIMER FOR FEDERAL AGENCES 14 n.2 (1991).
278 See 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994).
279 Id.
280 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-320, 110
Stat. No. 3870 (Supp 1I 1996).
281 The Act amends Title 5, § 571(3) to read as follows: "'alternative means of
dispute resolution' means any procedure that is used to resolve issues in controversy,
including, but not limited to, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, mini-
trials, arbitration, and use of ombuds, or any combination thereof." Id. § 571(3).
282 The Act amends 5 U.S.C. § 5740)(1994). See id. § 5740).
283 5 U.S.C. § 571(6) (Supp. H 1996).
284 5 U.S.C. § 571(8) (Supp. HI 1996).
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This would suggest that the confidentiality safeguards in the Act will apply
to only certain aspects of an ombuds's job.
This new law will also alleviate, although not totally remove, concerns
about required disclosure under FOIA and will likely strengthen
nondisclosure even under the Inspector General Act and the Office of
Government Ethics regulations. It may also strengthen arguments for
exceptions to record retention regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
This survey of the work of ombuds offices in five different federal
agencies strongly supports a conclusion that the establishment of a
workplace ombuds office can have a beneficial, cost-effective impact on the
functioning of an agency and its personnel.
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